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THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION ACT AT 25:
A QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE
INTERPRETIVE CASE LAW
Lucien J. Dhooge*
The [Religious Freedom Restoration Act] creates no new rights for
any religious practice or for any potential litigant. Not every free
exercise claim will prevail.1
While not its original intent, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
has become a vehicle for those seeking to impose their beliefs on
others or claim that the tenets of their faith justify discrimination.2
INTRODUCTION
On November 16, 1993, President Bill Clinton signed the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (RFRA) into law.3 RFRA was largely a reaction to the U.S. Supreme
Court’s opinion in Employment Division v. Smith,4 in which the Court refused to ex-
cuse individuals from compliance with neutral laws of general applicability on reli-
gious grounds.5 The result in Smith was reaffirmed in subsequent opinions, in which
the Court concluded that the government need satisfy the compelling interest test
only when reviewing laws targeting specific religious practices.6
* Sue and John Staton Professor of Law and Ethics, Scheller College of Business, Georgia
Institute of Technology. The author thanks Rachel Cook, Michelle Ellis, and Utena Yang for
their time and effort devoted to this Article.
1 Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Hearing on S. 2969 Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 102nd Cong. 2 (1992) (opening statement of Sen. Edward M. Kennedy, Member,
S. Comm. on Judiciary).
2 Press Release, Off. of Rep. Bobby Scott, Scott, Kennedy Introduce Amendment to Reli-
gious Freedom Restoration Act (May 18, 2016) (statement of Rep. Joseph P. Kennedy III (D-
Mass.)) (on file with author).
3 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2018).
4 494 U.S. 872 (1990). See also infra notes 8, 12 and accompanying text.
5 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 879.
6 See, e.g., Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 537–39
(1993) (holding that application of ordinances prohibiting animal cruelty to ritual animal sac-
rifice was intended to single out the practices of a discrete religious group for condemnation,
was not compelled by the government’s interests in protecting public health and preventing
cruelty to animals, and could have been tailored more narrowly to address specific issues con-
cerning disposal of organic waste).
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The holding in Smith changed the established standard for resolving conflicts
between secular statutes and religiously motivated conduct.7 The explicit purpose
of RFRA was to reinstate the previous standard and “restore the compelling interest
test as set forth in Sherbert . . . and . . . Yoder . . . and to guarantee its application
in all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened . . . .”8 RFRA thus
provided that the “[g]overnment shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise
of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, except . . .
in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and . . . [if the law] is the least
restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.”9
The necessity of RFRA was and remains controversial.10 The central assumption
of its proponents still is that there are credible threats to religious liberty which must
be addressed through the adoption of enhanced protections.11 Such protections are es-
pecially important to religious minorities and populations whose free exercise rights
7 See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404–07 (1963) (holding that the religious prac-
tices of a member of the Seventh-day Adventist Church, who lost her job due to her refusal
to work on Saturdays and was consequently denied unemployment compensation, were
unconstitutionally burdened because the asserted state interests in deterring the filing of
fraudulent claims and the effect of such filings upon the state’s unemployment fund and em-
ployers were not compelling); see also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 222–29, 234 (1972)
(overturning a state compulsory education statute on the basis that the state’s purported
interests in preparing students for participation in the political system and protecting them
from ignorance and exploitation by prospective employers were not compelling with respect
to Amish children).
8 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1). See also Bonnie I. Robin-Vergeer, Disposing of the Red
Herrings: A Defense of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 589, 743,
749 (1996) (characterizing Smith as placing “an insuperable burden” on free exercise and
encouraging governments to “run roughshod over religious conviction”). But see Marci A.
Hamilton, The Case for Evidence-Based Free Exercise Accommodation: Why the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act is Bad Public Policy, 9 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 129, 135–37
(2015) (contending that the result in Smith was “unfairly maligned and mischaracterized by
academics and religious lobbyists alike” who sought in RFRA not to restore the standards
established in Sherbert and Yoder but rather to “institute a new doctrine: a single super-strict
scrutiny standard to be applied across the board to all laws, which they had been unable to
secure from the Court”). According to Hamilton, the labeling of the Act as a “restoration”
was “false and deeply disrespectful” of the Court’s free exercise jurisprudence and “pulled
the wool over the eyes of legislators and the public.” Id. at 138, 141.
9 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a)–(b).
10 See, e.g., Robin-Vergeer, supra note 8, at 612.
11 See, e.g., id. at 742, 746 (contending that RFRA prevents the “cloaking [of] intentional
religious hostility under the guise of general, facially neutral laws” which have historically
served as “instruments of religious persecution”); Jeremy W. Peters, Fighting Gay Rights and
Abortion With the First Amendment, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2017 (quoting U.S. Att’y Gen.
Jefferson B. Sessions as stating that “[m]any Americans have felt that their freedom to prac-
tice their faith has been under attack . . . . The challenges our nation faces today concerning
our historic First Amendment right to the ‘free exercise’ of our faith have become acute.”).
2018] THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION ACT AT 25 155
have been historically discounted, such as incarcerated individuals.12 Additionally, the
expansion of protected classes, and especially the inclusion of the LGBTQ+ commu-
nity, in areas such as public accommodations, employment, and housing, have created
“an environment of potentially widespread First Amendment violations.”13 This ex-
pansion, without concomitant religious protections, forces some members of faith
communities to choose between upholding religious principles at a societal cost or
compromising their beliefs.14 Such choices fail to recognize the privileged position oc-
cupied by religion in the United States, and the broad latitude to which it is entitled.15
12 See generally Christopher C. Lund, RFRA, State RFRAs, and Religious Minorities, 53
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 163 (2016) (discussing the value of RFRA and state RFRAs for religious
minorities, including cases brought by incarcerated individuals). See also T.W. Brown, Ensur-
ing the Application of RFRA and RLUIPA in Pro Se Prisoner Litigation, 41 OHIO N. U. L. REV.
29, 59 (2014) (describing the expansion of constitutional rights for incarcerated individuals
as “one of the most stirring legal developments of the Twentieth Century”); Jason Gubi, The
Religious Freedom Restoration Act and Protection of Native American Religious Practices,
4 MOD. AM. 73, 78 (2008) (advocating for equal levels of accommodation for Native American
and mainstream religious practices pursuant to RFRA). In the view of these commentators,
RFRA fulfills the purpose of the Free Exercise Clause by protecting religious minorities from
discrimination resulting when:
[L]awmakers in a majoritarian system of government, most of whom
adhere to mainstream religions, take care to ensure that laws of general
applicability do not burden their own faiths, but are indifferent to, or ig-
norant of, the burdens such laws may place on faiths that are unknown
or strange to them.
Scott D. Pollock, Immigration Law vs. Religious Freedom: Using the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act to Challenge Restrictive Immigration Laws and Practices, 12 RUTGERS J.
L. & RELIGION 295, 303–04 (2011). But see Hamilton, supra note 8, at 142 (listing minority
religious and quasi-religious groups who could seek protection under RFRA as including
groups advocating polygamy, terrorism, racism, and child abuse).
13 Susan Nabet, Note, For Sale: The Threat of State Public Accommodations Law to the
First Amendment Rights of Artistic Businesses, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 1515, 1515–16 (2012)
(listing sexual orientation, marital status, personal appearance, medical condition, and genetic
information as examples of expanded protected classes). See also J. Brady Brammer, Comment,
Religious Groups and the Gay Rights Movement: Recognizing Common Ground, 2006 BYU
L. REV. 995, 1004 (2006) (arguing that changing social attitudes towards the LGBT commu-
nity will have the effect of placing the free exercise of religion in the “societal closet”).
14 See, e.g., Alan Brownstein, Taking Free Exercise Rights Seriously, 57 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 55, 134 (2006) (noting that compromise in free exercise disputes is unlikely as “religious
mandates are absolute . . . [and] [n]othing short of literal obedience is acceptable”); Andrew
Koppelman, You Can’t Hurry Love: Why Antidiscrimination Protections for Gay People
Should Have Religious Exemptions, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 125, 134 (2006) (contending that
“[a]ntigay discrimination is now sufficiently stigmatized that a business that openly discrimi-
nates is likely to pay an economic price for doing so”).
15 See Brownstein, supra note 14, at 80, 89–96 (describing religion as “privileged” given
that it provides “a source of values structurally divorced from government,” fosters spiritual
growth “isolated from material concerns . . . [and] the individual’s routine emphasis on material
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According to some RFRA proponents, any conflict with newer competing rights must
be resolved in favor of an “older set of liberties” such as religious freedom.16
Some RFRA opponents contend that the threat to religious liberty has been exag-
gerated, and that free exercise is not suppressed on a frequent or substantial basis.17
They assert that conflicts between religious liberty and secular laws have been limited
and fact-specific.18 According to some opponents, RFRA remains less about elimi-
nating widespread restraints upon religious liberty, and becomes more of a political
statement objecting to secularized society, including the increased acceptance of the
LGBTQ+ community.19 This political statement equates personal offense with religious
freedom and impermissibly attempts to foist religious beliefs upon those in the “secu-
lar sphere of life.”20 It also provides some objectors with a means by which to legiti-
mize discrimination, especially against the LGBTQ+ community.21 The possibilities
self-interest,” provides participants with a “communal dimension,” and preserves continuity
of beliefs and practices through tradition).
16 Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty and the Culture Wars, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 839,
840 (contending that “[t]he rise of one set of liberties threatens the decline of another, older
set of liberties”).
17 See, e.g., Ira C. Lupu, The Case Against Legislative Codification of Religious Liberty,
21 CARDOZO L. REV. 565, 566 (1999); Claire McCusker, When Church and State Collide:
Averting Democratic Disaffection in a Post-Smith World, 25 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 391, 396
(2007) (arguing that conflicts between secular laws and mainstream religious practices are
infrequent since laws of general applicability “were constructed with those religions as part
of their lawmakers’ worldviews, whether as their own religions or as religions shared by
those around them”).
18 See Lupu, supra note 17, at 566.
19 See, e.g., Nancy J. Knauer, Religious Exemptions, Marriage Equality, and the Estab-
lishment of Religion, 84 UMKC L. REV. 749, 785 (2016) (contending that efforts to secure
religious exemptions are due, in part, to “[c]onservative or traditional religious views hav[ing]
been marginalized due to evolving legal and social views in a number of areas, including re-
productive health, sex education, divorce, premarital sex, gender roles, and gender identity”);
McCusker, supra note 17, at 398 (noting that “traditionally religious individuals are more
likely to find their religious practices in conflict with facially neutral laws than they would
have a century ago when traditional religious moral notions were more widespread”). But see
Lund, supra note 12, at 164 (noting that the majority of RFRA cases “have little to do with
discrimination or sexual morality or the culture wars”).
20 Terri R. Day & Danielle Weatherby, LGBT Rights and the Mini RFRA: A Return to
Separate But Equal, 65 DEPAUL L. REV. 907, 912 (2016). See also Patrick J. McNulty &
Adam D. Zenor, Corporate Free Exercise of Religion and the Interpretation of Congres-
sional Intent: Where Will It End?, 39 S. ILL. U. L.J. 475, 479 (2015) (contending that “[t]he
end game for these twenty-first century conscientious objectors . . . is the judicial establish-
ment of . . . religious principle[s]”); Peters, supra note 11 (quoting Peter Montgomery, a
senior fellow at People for the American Way, as stating that proponents of enhanced religious
rights are attempting to “bring a very particular biblical worldview into dominance at all levels
of government and society”).
21 See, e.g., Day & Weatherby, supra note 20, at 911 (contending that, “[h]aving lost in the
courts, the opponents of same-sex marriage have altered their battle cry. Invoking religious
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of discriminatory application are “endless, provided the proponents of the exemption
can gather sufficient political support.”22 Finally, by turning every believer into a po-
tential “law unto himself,” RFRA becomes “a lawless, sometimes unconstitutional,
and pervasively unprincipled charade.”23 The rule of law in such a scenario is “swal-
lowed by a sea of self-interested yet functionally unreviewable exemption claims,”
the limits of which are dependent upon the self-restraint of the believers they benefit.24
freedom, instead of defending their right to discriminate, they now claim to be the victims of
discrimination”) (emphasis removed); Andrew Koppelman, Gay Rights, Religious Accom-
modations, and the Purposes of Antidiscrimination Law, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 619, 644 (2015)
(discussing the utilization of religion to “encourage the formation of new centers of resistance
to the gay rights movement”); Ira C. Lupu, Moving Targets: Obergefell, Hobby Lobby, and
the Future of LGBT Rights, 7 ALA. CIV. RTS. & CIV. LIB. L. REV. 1, 65 (2015) (concluding that
religious exemptions “may embolden potential discriminators and discourage litigation by their
victims”) (citation omitted); The Editorial Board, Their Cake Was Not a First Amendment
Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2017 (describing support for a right of business owners to refuse
service to members of the LGBTQ+ community as a “rear-guard action undertaken by reli-
gious objectors who, thwarted in their efforts to prevent gay couples from enjoying the rights
and benefits that flow from marriage, are now invoking their own constitutional rights to avoid
treating those same couples equally in the marketplace”). For a discussion of the potential
harms suffered by the LGBTQ+ community in the event of an adoption of widespread
religious exemptions, see Lucien J. Dhooge, Public Accommodation Statutes and Sexual
Orientation: Should There Be a Religious Exemption for Secular Businesses?, 21 WM. &
MARY J. WOMEN & L. 319, 356–68 (2015) [hereinafter Dhooge, Public Accommodation
Statutes and Sexual Orientation]; see also Justin Muehlmeyer, Toward a New Age of Consumer
Access Rights: Creating Space in the Public Accommodation for the LGBT Community, 19
CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 781, 809 (2013).
22 Knauer, supra note 19, at 785. See also Marci A. Hamilton, The Religious Freedom
Restoration Act: Letting the Fox into the Henhouse under Cover of Section 5 of the Four-
teenth Amendment, 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 357, 380 (1994) (contending that RFRA’s granting
of at-will exemptions to neutral laws of general application is akin to placing “the proverbial
fox in the henhouse . . . [with] an endless supply of chickens”); Hanna Martin, Note, Race,
Religion, and RFRA: The Implications of Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. in Employ-
ment Discrimination, 2016 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 1, 3 (2016) (noting that RFRA, as
interpreted by the Supreme Court, has “the potential to provide . . . sweeping exemptions to
neutral, generally applicable laws for businesses that object on religious grounds”).
23 Ira C. Lupu, Hobby Lobby and the Dubious Enterprise of Religious Exemptions, 38
HARV. J. L. & GENDER 35, 49, 101 (2015). See also Dhooge, Public Accommodation Statutes
and Sexual Orientation, supra note 21, at 361 (describing religious exemptions as “far too
vague and capable of abuse to be a serious basis for legislation” (citing Michael Kent Curtis,
Essay, A Unique Religious Exemption from Antidiscrimination Laws in the Case of Gays?
Putting the Call for Exemptions for Those Who Discriminate Against Married or Marrying
Gays in Context, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 173, 194 (2012))); Frederick Mark Gedicks,
“Substantial” Burdens: How Courts May (and Why They Must) Judge Burdens on Religion
Under RFRA, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 94, 98 (2017) (arguing that “[i]f judicial review is con-
fined to claimant sincerity and secular costs, the substantiality of a claimed religious burden
under RFRA is effectively established by the claimant’s mere say-so”).
24 Gedicks, supra note 23, at 100–01.
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There has been no detailed study of RFRA utilizing the best body of evidence
indicative of its impact; specifically, federal case law applying its provisions. This
Article provides such a study. The Article concludes that RFRA has not been as effec-
tive as its supporters may have hoped, nor as pernicious as its critics have contended.
I. AN ANALYSIS OF RFRA UTILIZING THE INTERPRETIVE CASE LAW
A. Methodology
This Article seeks to measure the impact of RFRA through an analysis of interpre-
tive federal case law. The Article’s hypothesis is that RFRA has been less effective
and harmful than its supporters and opponents contend. Rather, RFRA has success-
fully been utilized in only a limited number of circumstances.
The Article measures RFRA’s impact through an analysis of four data points.
These data points are: (1) the date of the relevant opinions of the U.S. Supreme Court,
federal circuit courts of appeals, and federal district courts; (2) the identity of the par-
ties utilizing RFRA; (3) the subject matter of the claims and whether their utilization
was offensive or defensive; and (4) the successful or unsuccessful outcome of each
claim. Discussion of each data point is preceded by expected results and concludes
with an analysis of the actual results.
The sample consists of 303 court opinions; specifically, 4 Supreme Court opin-
ions,25 94 opinions of courts of appeals,26 and 205 district court opinions.27 Opinions
of the Supreme Court and federal circuit courts of appeals are addressed together as
appellate courts. Opinions applying RFRA to the actions of state and local govern-
ments were not included, pursuant to the Supreme Court’s exclusion of such govern-
ments from the statute’s reach.28 Multiple opinions resulting from challenges to the
25 See Wheaton Coll. v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2806 (2014); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores,
Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014); Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente União Do Vegetal,
546 U.S. 418 (2006); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
26 The sample consisted of federal circuit court of appeals opinions from the following
circuits: District of Columbia Circuit (eighteen opinions); First Circuit (one opinion); Second
Circuit (seven opinions); Third Circuit (ten opinions); Fourth Circuit (four opinions); Fifth
Circuit (four opinions); Sixth Circuit (two opinions); Seventh Circuit (five opinions); Eighth
Circuit (seven opinions); Ninth Circuit (twenty-three opinions); Tenth Circuit (six opinions);
and Eleventh Circuit (seven opinions). See Research Notes, Religious Freedom Restoration
Act Case Data (Oct. 11, 2017) [hereinafter RFRA Case Data] (on file with author).
27 The sample consisted of district court opinions from the following circuits: District of
Columbia Circuit (nineteen opinions); First Circuit (six opinions); Second Circuit (seventeen
opinions); Third Circuit (twenty-three opinions); Fourth Circuit (twenty-five opinions); Fifth
Circuit (twenty-two opinions); Sixth Circuit (thirteen opinions); Seventh Circuit (fifteen
opinions); Eighth Circuit (ten opinions); Ninth Circuit (thirty-one opinions); Tenth Circuit
(twenty opinions); and Eleventh Circuit (five opinions). See RFRA Case Data, supra note 26.
28 See Flores, 521 U.S. at 532–36.
2018] THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION ACT AT 25 159
contraceptive mandate contained within the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act were consolidated into two U.S. Supreme Court opinions addressing the man-
date in the context of educational institutions and business organizations.29 The year
1994 was selected as the starting date, given that the first court opinions were decided
in that year.30 The end of the calendar year 2016 was selected as the conclusory date.
Court opinions announced during this time period were included in the analysis
if they addressed RFRA either from a procedural standpoint or on the merits. Cases in
which a RFRA claim was asserted, but not addressed, were not included in the sample.
The most recent court opinion in which a claim was addressed served as the represen-
tative opinion for the particular case in question. Thus, the outcome in a later appellate
opinion in which a RFRA claim was addressed served as the representative opinion.
However, the outcome in an earlier opinion by a lower court was utilized if an appel-
late court did not specifically address the RFRA claim in its subsequent opinion.
B. Data Point One: Dates of Opinions
An initial means by which to ascertain RFRA’s impact is how often claims are
addressed by federal courts. We would expect the number of opinions to increase over
time if there was a growing threat to religious liberty. Such an increase would also
be expected if RFRA posed the risks claimed by its opponents.
1. Dates of U.S. Appellate Court Opinions
Issuance of appellate opinions began slowly in the 1990s, although commencing
in 1995, there was at least one opinion issued every year.31 The number of opinions
increased in 2007, peaked in 2008, and then began to decline in 2009.32 The number
of opinions issued subsequent to 2009 has remained relatively steady with only two
deviations in 2013 and 2014.33 Opinions reached double digits in only two years, 2008
and 2014, in which eleven opinions were issued. Opinions have decreased in ensuing
years, with opinions in 2015 and 2016 similar in number to those fifteen years earlier.34
Opinions issued by the District of Columbia Circuit and the Third and Ninth Circuits
29 See Wheaton Coll., 134 S. Ct. at 2807; Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. at 2775–
76, 2780–85; see also Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-
(13)(a)(4) (2018); Women’s Preventive Services Guidelines, 77 Fed. Reg. 8725 (Feb. 15,
2012). The inclusion of all the opinions addressing challenges to the contraceptive mandate
would have been unduly duplicative, skewed the results, and interfered with answering the
Article’s fundamental question, namely, the overall effectiveness of RFRA.
30 See RFRA Case Data, supra note 26.
31 See id.
32 See id.
33 See id.
34 See id.
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constituted 54.2% of appellate opinions, with the Ninth Circuit responsible for 24.5%
of all opinions.35 The dates of appellate opinions are summarized in Table 1 below.
Table 1: Dates of Opinions in U.S. Appellate Courts
YEAR OPINIONS YEAR OPINIONS
1994 0 2006 4
1995 2 2007 6
1996 5 2008 11
1997 2 2009 6
1998 2 2010 4
1999 4 2011 6
2000 5 2012 6
2001 3 2013 3
2002 3 2014 11
2003 3 2015 5
2004 1 2016 5
2005 1 Total 98
Chart 1
35 See id.
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2. Dates of U.S. District Court Opinions
District court opinions followed a different path than their appellate counter-
parts.36 The number of district court opinions grew slowly but steadily from 1994
through 2006 before experiencing significant growth starting in 2007 and continuing
until 2011.37 The number of opinions dropped in 2011 and 2012, but, unlike appel-
late court opinions, resumed growth and reached record levels in 2015 and 2016.38
This pattern may reflect the larger number of district courts as compared to appel-
late courts, and consequent increased opportunities to address RFRA-related issues.39
This pattern may also reflect a growing recognition of RFRA as a means by which
to advance religion-related claims and their settlement, thereby eliminating the ne-
cessity of appellate review. Opinions in the District of Columbia and Third, Fourth,
and Ninth Circuits constituted 47.6% of the district court opinions, with courts within
the Ninth Circuit constituting 15.1% of all opinions.40 The dates of district court opin-
ions are summarized in Table 2 below.
Table 2: Dates of Opinions in U.S. District Courts
YEAR OPINIONS YEAR OPINIONS
1994 5 2006 8
1995 3 2007 13
1996 6 2008 10
1997 6 2009 18
1998 8 2010 15
1999 3 2011 9
2000 4 2012 9
2001 6 2013 14
2002 1 2014 8
2003 0 2015 22
2004 4 2016 27
2005 6 Total 205
36 See id.
37 See id.
38 See id.
39 See id.
40 See id.; see also supra note 27 and accompanying text.
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Chart 2
3. Composite Dates of Opinions
The composite data reflects the increased number of district court opinions.41 The
number of opinions varied significantly from 1994 through 2005, before increasing
to double digits in 2006, where it has remained stable.42 Although the number of opin-
ions has varied over the ensuing ten years, there has been consistent growth since
2015, and a peak in the last two years of the survey.43 The number of opinions has
grown by more than 2.5 times since 2006 and more than 4.5 times since the last time
the number of opinions was in single digits in 2005.44 The number of opinions has
grown by a factor of 6.4 since 1994.45 Courts in four circuits constitute slightly more
than half of the opinions.46 Composite appellate and district court opinions are sum-
marized in Table 3 below.
41 See RFRA Case Data, supra note 26.
42 See id.
43 See id.
44 See id.
45 See id.
46 The four circuits are the Ninth Circuit (fifty-four opinions constituting 17.8% of
opinions), the District of Columbia Circuit (thirty-seven opinions constituting 12.2% of
opinions), the Third Circuit (thirty-three opinions constituting 10.9% of opinions), and the
Fourth Circuit (twenty-eight opinions constituting 9.2% of opinions). See id.
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Table 3: Dates of Opinions in All Federal Courts
YEAR OPINIONS YEAR OPINIONS
1994 5 2006 12
1995 5 2007 19
1996 11 2008 21
1997 8 2009 24
1998 10 2010 19
1999 7 2011 15
2000 9 2012 15
2001 9 2013 17
2002 4 2014 19
2003 3 2015 27
2004 5 2016 32
2005 7 Total 303
Chart 3a
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Chart 3b
The increasing number of opinions between 2006 and 2016 may support argu-
ments of RFRA proponents. This conclusion assumes the increase is a direct result of
a growing threat to religious liberty. Another equally plausible argument is that parties
and their attorneys have discovered or rediscovered RFRA as a potential source of
claims. This rediscovery may be due, in part, to the increased prominence of RFRA
as a result of highly visible Supreme Court opinions and renewed interest in RFRA’s
state counterparts.47 It is also possible that an increasingly diverse and vocal populace 
47 See, e.g., supra note 25. Twenty states have adopted RFRAs through express consti-
tutional or legislative provisions, with six of these adoptions occurring in the past nine years.
See Lucien J. Dhooge, Public Accommodation Statutes, Sexual Orientation and Religious
Liberty: Free Access or Free Exercise?, 27 FLA. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 5 nn.12–13, 6 n.16
(2016). For a detailed description of the provisions of state RFRAs, see id. at 27, 32–33,
50–58. For an analysis of the effectiveness of state RFRAs, see Lucien J. Dhooge, The
Impact of State Religious Freedom Restoration Acts: An Analysis of the Interpretive Case
Law, 52 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 585 (2017) [hereinafter Dhooge, State RFRAs]. See also
Christopher C. Lund, Religious Liberty After Gonzales: A Look at State RFRAs, 55 S.D. L.
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is more strongly asserting its free exercise rights. This does not necessarily equate
with a growing threat to religious liberty, but it may reflect a more activist approach
to the assertion of such rights. The increase may also be indicative of a recognition
that claims have a greater likelihood of success as RFRA jurisprudence has matured.
The increasing number of opinions may also support the views of RFRA oppo-
nents. However, this conclusion is based upon the assumption that the increase in the
number of opinions has been accompanied by an increase in successful outcomes in
favor of religious claimants. It must also be assumed that these successful outcomes
have resulted in harm. Certainly these assumptions are possibilities. However, the
increased utilization of RFRA alone does not support either assumption. This con-
clusion does not trivialize concerns regarding efforts to employ RFRA as a vehicle for
discrimination, nor the potential harm to impacted individuals and groups. Rather,
in the same manner as the assumption regarding threats to religious liberty, no con-
vincing conclusion may be drawn exclusively from RFRA’s increased presence in
federal court jurisprudence. All possibilities on both sides of the RFRA “coin” are
plausible, but none are definitive, absent a deeper analysis of the relevant case law.
C. Data Point Two: Identity of Claimants
A second means by which to assess RFRA’s impact is through identification of
claimants. A significant number of claims, especially by places of worship and reli-
gious organizations, would be expected if religious liberty increasingly was threat-
ened in the manner claimed by RFRA proponents. A significant number of claims,
especially by business organizations, educational institutions, and individuals, would
indicate that RFRA poses the risks claimed by opponents.
Claimants were organized in seven different categories48: (1) places of worship,
and associated religious officials; (2) religious organizations other than places of
worship; (3) non-profit organizations other than places of worship and religious or-
ganizations; (4) private (nonincarcerated) individuals;49 (5) business organizations;
(6) educational institutions; and (7) incarcerated individuals.50 The first-named claim-
ant was utilized in cases in which there were multiple claimants.51
REV. 466 (2010); Ira C. Lupu, Hobby Lobby and the Dubious Enterprise of Religious
Exemptions, 38 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 35 (2015).
48 See RFRA Case Data, supra note 26.
49 This Article distinguishes between incarcerated individuals and nonincarcerated indi-
viduals because of the differences in restraints placed upon the free exercise of religion
between the groups, and the resultant differences in the types of legal claims these groups
may assert.
50 See RFRA Case Data, supra note 26.
51 See id.
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1. Identity of Claimants in U.S. Appellate Courts
Fifty percent of claimants in appellate courts were incarcerated individuals.52
Cases filed by incarcerated individuals constituted at least half of all claims addressed
in seven circuits.53 Private individuals were most prevalent in three circuits,54 and
places of worship were predominant at the Supreme Court.55 However, claims by in-
carcerated individuals were still significant in these circuits, with the exceptions of the
Supreme Court and the First Circuit.56 Places of worship and religious organizations
were the distinct minority in every appellate court other than the Supreme Court and
the Sixth and Seventh Circuits.57 Unsurprisingly, given its size, the Ninth Circuit had
the most diverse group of claimants, although twenty of the twenty-three claimants
were either incarcerated or private individuals.58 The identity of claimants in appel-
late courts is summarized in Table 4 below.59
Table 4: Identity of Claimants in U.S. Appellate Courts
IDENTITY CLAIMS PERCENTAGE
Incarcerated individuals 49 50.0%
Private individuals 31 31.6%
Places of worship 11 11.2%
Religious organizations 3 3.1%
52 See id.
53 These circuits are: Third Circuit (80.0% of ten claims); Fourth Circuit (50.0% of four
claims); Fifth Circuit (50.0% of four claims); Seventh Circuit (60.0% of five claims); Eighth
Circuit (57.1% of seven claims); Tenth Circuit (100.0% of six claims); and Eleventh Circuit
(57.1% of seven claims). See id.
54 Claims by private individuals were predominant in the D.C. Circuit (44.4% of eighteen
claims), the First Circuit (100.0% of one claim), and the Second Circuit (71.4% of seven
claims). See id.
55 Fifty percent of the claims addressed by the Supreme Court were initiated by places of
worship. See id.
56 Claims by incarcerated individuals were 33.3% of eighteen claims in the D.C. Circuit
and 28.6% of seven claims in the Second Circuit. See id.
57 Places of worship and religious organizations constituted the following percentage of
claimants in these circuits: D.C. Circuit (22.2% of eighteen claims); Third Circuit (10.0% of
ten claims); Fifth Circuit (25.0% of four claims); Eighth Circuit (14.3% of seven claims); and
Ninth Circuit (8.7% of twenty-three claims). See id. Claims by places of worship and reli-
gious organizations constituted 50.0% of four claims in the Supreme Court, 50.0% of two
claims in the Sixth Circuit, and 40.0% of five claims in the Seventh Circuit. See id.
58 Incarcerated and private individuals initiated 47.8% and 39.1% of the twenty-three
claims addressed by the Ninth Circuit, respectively. See id. The remaining three claims were
initiated by places of worship, and non-profit and religious organizations. See id.
59 Percentages were calculated to the tenths, and thus totals may not equal one hundred
percent of claims in all cases.
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IDENTITY CLAIMS PERCENTAGE
Educational institutions 2 2.0%
Non-profit organizations 1 1.0%
Business organizations 1 1.0%
Total 98 99.9%
Chart 4
An additional observation relates to the claimants’ religious affiliations. Claim-
ants in appellate courts reflect the wide diversity of religions in the United States.60
60 Religious identities of claimants were derived from the text of the surveyed opinions.
The most specific description in a given opinion was utilized for purposes of identification.
Thus, faiths within the Christian tradition are separately designated when such faiths were
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There were twenty-eight different identified faiths in the appellate sample.61 The most
religiously diverse claimants were incarcerated individuals who alleged violations
of the beliefs and practices of fifteen different religions.62 Other categories of claim-
ants were somewhat less diverse.63 Islam, Native American practices, and Christianity
were most prevalent among appellate court claimants.64
2. Identity of Claimants in U.S. District Courts
Incarcerated individuals were responsible for 61.9% of claims filed in district
courts.65 Incarcerated individuals were claimants in at least half of all opinions in
eight circuits.66 These opinions were the majority in two of the four circuits where
specifically identified in an opinion. The classification of “Christianity” was utilized only
when an opinion did not identify a specific Christian-based faith. See RFRA Case Data,
supra note 26.
61 The religious affiliations of claimants in appellate courts were Atheism, Baptist,
Buddhism, Cannabis Sacrament Ministry, Christianity, Church of Cognizance, Church of
Marijuana, Church of Reality, Episcopal Church, Ethiopian Coptic Church, Evangelical Free
Church, Hawaii Cannabis Ministry, Islam, Judaism, Missionary Church of Christ, Moorish,
Mormonism, Native American, Optic, Protestantism, Rastafarianism, Roman Catholicism,
Santería, Secular Humanism, Seventh-day Adventist, Society of Friends (Quaker), Yahweh,
and Yoruba. See id.
62 The religious affiliations of incarcerated individuals included Islam (fourteen claims),
Native American (eight claims), Rastafarianism (seven claims), Judaism (four claims),
Roman Catholicism (two claims), and Buddhism, Cannabis Sacrament Ministry, Christianity,
Church of Cognizance, Church of Marijuana, Hawaii Cannabis Ministry, Moorish, Santería,
Yahweh, and Yoruba (one claim each). See id. The religious affiliation of four incarcerated
individuals were unspecified. See id.
63 The religious affiliations of private individuals included Christianity (five claims),
Roman Catholicism, Islam, and Native American (three claims each), Society of Friends
(Quaker) (two claims), and Atheism, Church of Reality, Episcopal Church, Ethiopian Coptic
Church, Mormonism, Protestantism, Secular Humanism, and Seventh-day Adventist (one
claim each). See id. The religious affiliations of seven individuals were unspecified. See id.
The religious affiliation of places of worship included Roman Catholicism and Christianity
(three claims each), Native American (two claims), and Baptist, Evangelical Free Church,
and Judaism (one claim each). See id. The religious affiliations of religious organizations
included Islam, Missionary Church of Christ, and Rastafarianism (one claim each). See id.
Both educational institutions were affiliated with Christianity. See id. The sole non-profit
organization identified as Native American, and the sole business organization identified as
Christian. See id.
64 Claims based upon Islam were 18.7% of all claims, followed by Native American
practices (14.3%), and Christianity (12.2%). See id.
65 See id.
66 These circuits are: First Circuit (50.0% of six claims); Third Circuit (73.9% of twenty-
three claims); Fourth Circuit (70.8% of twenty-five claims); Fifth Circuit (81.8% of twenty-
two claims); Sixth Circuit (61.5% of thirteen claims); Seventh Circuit (86.7% of fifteen
claims); Tenth Circuit (65% of twenty claims); and Eleventh Circuit (80% of five claims).
See id.
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they did not exceed 50%,67 and were at least 40% in the two circuits in which in-
carcerated individuals were not the largest claimant.68
Private individuals were the second largest claimant in every circuit, with the ex-
ception of the Eighth and Ninth Circuits in which they were the largest claimant.69
Places of worship and religious organizations were the minority in every circuit and
were completely absent from the D.C., First, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits.70 Business
organizations appeared only twice as claimants in the Third and Sixth Circuits.71
Unsurprisingly, the Ninth Circuit had the most diverse group of claimants, although
twenty-seven of the thirty-one claimants were either incarcerated or private individ-
uals.72 The identity of claimants in district courts is summarized in Table 5 below.
Table 5: Identity of Claimants in U.S. District Courts
IDENTITY CLAIMS PERCENTAGE
Incarcerated individuals 127 61.9%
Private individuals 54 26.3%
Places of worship 8 3.9%
Non-profit organizations 6 2.9%
Religious organizations 5 2.4%
Educational institutions 3 1.5%
Business organizations 2 1.0%
Total 205 99.9%
67 Incarcerated individuals constituted 47.4% of the nineteen claimants in the D.C. Circuit,
followed by private individuals (31.6%), non-profit organizations (15.8%), and educational
institutions (5.3%). See id. Incarcerated individuals were 47.0% of the seventeen claimants in
the Second Circuit, followed by claims by private individuals (35.3%), religious organizations
(11.8%), and places of worship (5.9%). See id.
68 Incarcerated individuals constituted 40.0% of the ten claimants in the Eighth Circuit.
See id. Fifty percent of claimants in the Eighth Circuit were private individuals. See id.
Incarcerated individuals constituted 41.9% of the thirty-one claimants in the Ninth Circuit.
See id. Private individuals were 45.2% of claimants in the Ninth Circuit. See id.
69 Private individuals constituted the following percentages of claimants in these circuits:
First Circuit (33.3% of six claimants); Third Circuit (13% of twenty-three claimants); Fourth
Circuit (20.8% of twenty-five claimants); Fifth Circuit (18.2% of twenty-two claimants);
Sixth Circuit (23.1% of thirteen claimants); Seventh Circuit (6.7% of fifteen claimants);
Tenth Circuit (20.0% of twenty claimants); and Eleventh Circuit (20.0% of five claimants).
See id.; see also supra note 68 and accompanying text.
70 Places of worship and religious organizations constituted the following percentages of
claimants in these circuits: Second Circuit (17.8% of seventeen claimants); Third Circuit
(8.7% of twenty-three claimants); Fourth Circuit (4.2% of twenty-four claimants); Sixth
Circuit (7.7% of thirteen claimants); Seventh Circuit (6.7% of fifteen claimants); Eighth
Circuit (10.0% of ten claimants); Ninth Circuit (6.5% of thirty-one claimants); and Tenth
Circuit (15.0% of twenty claimants). See RFRA Case Data, supra note 26.
71 See id.
72 See id. The remaining four claimants were places of worship (two claims) and non-profit
organizations and educational institutions (one claim each). See id.
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Chart 5
There were forty-six different faiths identified by claimants in district courts.73
Once again, the most religiously diverse claimants were incarcerated individuals who
alleged violations of the beliefs and practices of thirty-four different religions.74 Other
73 The religious affiliations of claimants in district courts were Amish, Apostolic, Atheism,
Baptist, Buddhism, Christian Identity, Christianity, Church of Greater Faith and Redemption,
Church of the Creator, Conscientious Objector, Druidism, Eckankar, Ethiopian Coptic Zion,
Faithist, Fundamentalist Latter-Day Saints, Healing Church, Hebrew Messianic Israelite,
Humanism, Ifá, Islam, Judaism, Mennonism, Messianic Sabbatarianism, Methodism, Moorish,
Mormonism, Nation of Gods, Native American, Objectivism, Odinism, Orthodox Christianity,
Our Church, Pentecostalism, Rainbow Family, Rastafarianism, Roman Catholicism, Romani
American, Santa Muerte, Santería, Santo Daime, Seventh-day Adventism, Sikhism, Thelema,
Tien Tao, Wicca, and Yahweh. See id.
74 The religious affiliations of incarcerated individuals included Islam (thirty-four claims);
Judaism (fourteen claims); Rastafarianism (thirteen claims); Native American (twelve claims);
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categories of claimants were less diverse.75 Roman Catholicism, Christianity, and
Islam were the most commonly identified faiths.76
3. Composite Identity of Claimants
One hundred and seventy-six claims, nearly 58.0% of the combined cases,
were filed by incarcerated individuals.77 Private individuals filed eighty-five claims,
which constituted 28.0% of combined cases.78 Combined cases involving places of
worship and religious organizations constituted a mere 8.9% of the total.79 Com-
bined cases involving non-profit and business organizations and educational in-
stitutions were within a few percentage points of their appellate and district court
totals.80 The identities of claimants in appellate and district courts are summarized
in Table 6 below.
Christianity (five claims); Santería (three claims), Odinism, Roman Catholicism, and Thelema
(two claims each); and Amish, Apostolic, Asatru, Buddhism, Christian Identity, Church of the
Creator, Druidism, Eckankar, Ethiopian Coptic Church, Faithism, Fundamentalist Latter-Day
Saints, Hebrew Messianic Israelite, Ifá, Mennonism, Moorish, Mormonism, Nations of God,
Objectivism, Orthodox Christianity, Our Church, Rainbow Family, Romani American, Santa
Muerte, Wicca, and Yahweh (one claim each). The affiliation of fifteen incarcerated individuals
were unspecified. See id.
75 The religious affiliations of private individuals included Christianity (eleven claims);
Islam (five claims); Native American and Sikhism (four claims each); Society of Friends
(Quaker) (three claims); Atheism, Conscientious Objector, and Judaism (two claims each);
and Apostolic, Baptist, Church of Greater Faith and Redemption, Healing Church, Humanism,
Mormonism, Rainbow Family, Rastafarianism, Roman Catholicism, and Tien Tao (one claim
each). See id. The religious affiliations of eleven individuals were unspecified. See id. The
religious affiliations of places of worship included Christianity (two claims); and Baptist,
Methodism, Pentecostalism, Roman Catholicism, Santo Daime, and Seventh-day Adventism
(one claim each). See id. The religious affiliations of non-profit organizations included
Christianity (two claims); and Islam and Roman Catholicism (one claim each). See id. The
religious affiliations of two non-profit organizations were unspecified. See id. The affiliations
of religious organizations included Pentecostalism (two claims); and Christianity and Society
of Friends (Quaker) (one claim each). See id. The affiliation of one religious organization
was unspecified. See id. All three educational institution claimants identified as Roman
Catholic. See id. The affiliations of the two business organizations were Baptist and Chris-
tianity. See id.
76 Claims based upon Islam constituted 19.5% of claims followed by Christianity (10.7%),
and Native American practices (7.8%). See id.
77 See RFRA Case Data, supra note 26.
78 See id.
79 See id.
80 See id. Compare supra note 26, with supra note 27.
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Table 6: Identities of Claimants in All Federal Courts
IDENTITY CLAIMS PERCENTAGE
Incarcerated individuals 176 58.1%
Private individuals 85 28.0%
Places of worship 19 6.3%
Religious organizations 8 2.6%
Non-profit organizations 7 2.3%
Educational institutions 5 1.7%
Business organizations 3 1.0%
Total 303 100.0%
Chart 6
The sizable number of claims asserted by incarcerated individuals was anticipated
given a similar pattern in their utilization of state RFRAs.81 Whether federal lawmakers
81 See Dhooge, State RFRAs, supra note 47, at 600, tbl.6 (finding that claims filed by
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anticipated the dominant pattern of usage of RFRA by incarcerated individuals is un-
certain.82 Federal legislators clearly intended to protect the religious rights of incar-
cerated individuals in subsequent legislation.83 Nevertheless, as in the case of state
RFRAs, the primary claimants have been incarcerated individuals, indicating the un-
certainty surrounding the federal RFRA’s impact.84 As previously noted, if RFRA has
accomplished anything, it has been in protecting a diverse array of religious beliefs
and practices.85
The data reflects the dominance of incarcerated individuals as claimants.86 In-
carcerated individuals were the single largest class of claimants in ten of the twelve
circuits.87 The cases also show sustained utilization of RFRA by private individuals.88
Individuals constituted the second largest category of claimants in nine circuits, and
were the largest group of claimants in the Second Circuit.89
Places of worship constituted a considerably smaller group of claimants, failed to
reach double digits in any circuit, and were completely absent in the First and Eleventh
incarcerated individuals constituted 43.9% of all claims filed in federal and state courts al-
leging violations of state RFRAs between 1993 and 2015).
82 Cf. id. at 603–04 (suggesting that state lawmakers did not anticipate a dominant pattern
of RFRA usage by incarcerated individuals).
83 See Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc(a),
2000cc-2(a) (2018) (prohibiting the imposition of a “substantial burden” on the exercise of
religion by institutionalized persons unless such burden is “in furtherance of a compelling
governmental interest” and is the “least restrictive means of furthering” such interest, and
allowing for violations to serve as claims or defenses in judicial proceedings and as the basis
for “appropriate relief against a government”). But see Brown, supra note 12 and accom-
panying text.
84 See Dhooge, State RFRAs, supra note 47, at 603–04.
85 See supra notes 61–63, 73–75 and accompanying text.
86 See supra note 53, 66 and accompanying text; see also supra Tables 4, 5 & 6.
87 Incarcerated individuals were predominant in the D.C. Circuit (fifteen claims); Third
Circuit (twenty-five claims); Fourth Circuit (nineteen claims); Fifth Circuit (twenty claims);
Sixth Circuit (nine claims); Seventh Circuit (sixteen claims); Eighth Circuit (eight claims);
Ninth Circuit (twenty-four claims); Tenth Circuit (nineteen claims); and Eleventh Circuit
(eight claims). See RFRA Case Data, supra note 26; see also supra notes 53, 56, 58, 66–68
and accompanying text; supra Tables 4, 5 & 6. Incarcerated individuals were not the largest
class of claimants in the First and Second Circuits. See RFRA Case Data, supra note 26.
There were three claims each by incarcerated and private individuals in the First Circuit. See
id. Private individuals outnumbered incarcerated individuals by eleven to ten in the Second
Circuit. See id.
88 See id.
89 Private individuals were the second-largest category of claimants in the D.C. Circuit
(fourteen claims); Third Circuit (four claims); Fourth Circuit (six claims); Fifth Circuit (five
claims); Sixth Circuit (three claims); Eighth Circuit (seven claims); Ninth Circuit (twenty-
three claims); Tenth Circuit (four claims); and Eleventh Circuit (four claims). See id. Places
of worship outnumbered private individuals by two to one in the Seventh Circuit. See id.; see
also supra notes 55, 57 and accompanying text; supra Tables 4, 5, & 6.
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Circuits.90 This dearth of claims perhaps is due to the absence of substantial barriers
to worship. If this explanation is correct, the necessity of RFRA is weaker. Neverthe-
less, individuals or places of worship filed more than one-third of all claims.91 This
number of filings would be expected if religious liberty was under threat, but whether
such claims pose the risks noted by opponents cannot definitively be answered with-
out inquiry into the nature of the asserted claims.
Religious and non-profit organizations, and educational institutions, have not
been active parties, filing only twenty claims, a mere 6.6% of all claims.92 Business
organizations have filed even fewer, with three claims constituting 1.0% of the en-
tire sample.93 The religious liberty of these organizations and institutions does not
appear to be under sustained attack, given the minuscule number of filings.94 The
small number of claims also does not pose the existential threat asserted by RFRA
opponents. An analysis of the subject matter of these claims is necessary to deter-
mine their importance.
D. Data Point Three: Subject Matter of Claims
A third lens through which to analyze RFRA’s impact is the subject matter of
claims. If RFRA has been effective in protecting religious liberties, a diverse set of
claims focusing on religious expression would be expected over time. This diversity
could pose a threat to the ability of government to perform necessary functions, in-
cluding the enforcement of antidiscrimination legislation.
Claims were organized into six different categories: (1) conditions of confinement;
(2) religious expression; (3) crime and tort defense; (4) legal processes; (5) land use;
and (6) education. The conditions of confinement category includes objections to in-
mate diet and grooming policies; access to religious items, materials, and facilities;
90 Claims by places of worship were: D.C., Ninth, and Tenth Circuits (three claims each),
Seventh Circuit (two claims), and Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits
(one claim each). See RFRA Case Data, supra note 26; see also supra notes 57, 70 and ac-
companying text; supra Tables 4, 5 & 6.
91 See RFRA Case Data, supra note 26.
92 Claims by religious organizations were split between the Second and Third Circuits
(two claims each) and the D.C., Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits (one claim each). See id.
Claims by non-profit organizations were split between the D.C. Circuit (three claims), Ninth
Circuit (two claims), and the First and Eighth Circuits (one claim each). Claims by educational
institutions were split between the Fourth Circuit (two claims) and U.S. Supreme Court and
the D.C. and Ninth Circuits (one claim each). See id.; see also supra note 70 and accom-
panying text; supra Tables 4, 5 & 6.
93 Business organizations were claimants in three cases in the U.S. Supreme Court, and
the Third and Sixth Circuits. See RFRA Case Data, supra note 26; see also supra notes 25,
29 and accompanying text; supra Tables 4, 5 & 6.
94 See Dhooge, State RFRAs, supra note 47, at 602.
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mistreatment on the basis of religion; drug testing; and participation in religious cere-
monies.95 Religious expression includes those cases concerning expressive conduct
in the workplace and in public and private forums, and possession of items having
religious significance.96 The crime and tort defense category “includes cases in which
RFRA was utilized as a defense to the commission of a criminal offense or tort, or as
the basis for an objection to criminal procedures.”97 Legal processes claims include
cases in which RFRA was utilized as an objection to government mandates and civil
judicial procedures.98 Land-use claims include disputes concerning zoning; use and
building permits; variances; and access to, and use of, federal lands having religious
significance.99 The education category includes cases concerning provision of equal
services to religious schools, and curricular issues.100 The first or primary claim ad-
dressed in the surveyed opinions was utilized for identification purposes in cases in
which there were multiple claims.
1. Subject Matter of Claims in U.S. Appellate Courts
Conditions of confinement, religious expression, and the crime and tort defense,
were the predominant claims in appellate courts. Almost one-third of claims arose
from conditions of confinement.101 The remaining claims by incarcerated individu-
als, an additional 19.4% of appellate claims, implicated the crime and tort defense
category.102 Religious expression claims were 23.5% of appellate claims.103 The ma-
jority of these claims (78.3%) were asserted by individuals.104 The subject matter of
95 See RFRA Case Data, supra note 26; see also Dhooge, State RFRAs, supra note 47,
at 606.
96 See Dhooge, State RFRAs, supra note 47, at 606.
97 Id.
98 See id.
99 See id. at 606, 645.
100 See id. at 606.
101 The thirty claims based upon conditions of confinement were divided among the fol-
lowing circuits: Third Circuit (eight claims); D.C. Circuit (six claims); Seventh and Eleventh
Circuits (three claims each); Second, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits (two claims each); Fifth,
Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits (one claim each). See RFRA Case Data, supra note 26.
102 The nineteen crime and tort defense claims by incarcerated individuals were allocated
among the following circuits: Ninth Circuit (eight claims); Tenth Circuit (five claims); Eighth
Circuit (four claims); Fifth and Eleventh Circuits (one claim each). See id. The two remaining
crime and tort defense claims concerned a place of worship contesting the issuance of a con-
tempt citation for failure to comply with a subpoena, and an individual challenging the obli-
gation to pay federal income taxes. See In re Grand Jury Empaneling of Special Grand Jury,
171 F.3d 826 (3d Cir. 1999); Adams v. Comm’r, 170 F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 1999).
103 See RFRA Case Data, supra note 26.
104 The eighteen religious expression claims brought by individuals were allocated among
the following circuits: D.C. Circuit (five claims); Ninth Circuit (four claims); Second and 
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these claims was diverse.105 Five religious expression claims involved places of wor-
ship and religious organizations.106
The remaining 24.5% of claims concerned legal processes, land use, and educa-
tion.107 The majority of legal processes claims (53.3%) were brought by private indi-
viduals.108 The remaining legal processes claims were asserted by places of worship,
Eleventh Circuits (three claims each); Eighth Circuit (two claims); and Fifth Circuit (one claim).
See id.
105 See, e.g., Newdow v. Peterson, 753 F.3d 105 (2d Cir. 2014) (concerning claimant’s
objection to “In God We Trust” on U.S. currency), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1000 (2015);
Mahoney v. Doe, 642 F.3d 1112 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (religious art on a public sidewalk); Harrell
v. Donahue, 638 F.3d 975 (8th Cir. 2011) (concerning failure to provide accommodation to
mail carrier who refused to work on Saturdays); Newdow v. Lefevre, 598 F.3d 638 (9th Cir.
2010) (concerning claimant’s objection to “In God We Trust” on U.S. currency), cert. denied,
562 U.S. 1271 (2011); Perkel v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 365 F. App’x 755 (9th Cir. 2010)
(marijuana possession on church property); Malouse v. Winter, 338 F. App’x 356 (5th Cir.
2009) (concerning refusal to dispense contraception); Potter v. Dist. of Columbia, 558 F.3d
542 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (concerning grooming policies for firefighters); Olsen v. Mukasey, 541
F.3d 827 (8th Cir. 2008) (marijuana possession), cert. denied, 556 U.S. 1221 (2009); Veitch
v. England, 471 F.3d 124 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (concerning claimant’s discharge from Navy
chaplaincy), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 809 (2007); Henderson v. Kennedy, 265 F.3d 1072 (D.C.
Cir. 2001) (concerning ban on T-shirt sales on the National Mall), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 986
(2002); Gibson v. Babbitt, 223 F.3d 1256 (11th Cir. 2000) (possession of eagle feathers);
Browne v. United States, 176 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 1999) (concerning objection to utilization of
income tax payments to support the military), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1116 (2000); Hall v. Am.
Nat’l Red Cross, 86 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 1996) (concerning denial of counseling certification),
cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1010 (1996).
106 See Listecki v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors, 780 F.3d 731 (7th Cir. 2015)
(concerning Archdiocese of Milwaukee’s transfer of funds from bankruptcy estate), cert.
denied, 136 S. Ct. 581 (2015); McAllen Grace Brethren Church v. Salazar, 764 F.3d 465 (5th
Cir. 2014) (possession of eagle feathers); Multi-Denominational Ministry of Cannabis &
Rastafari, Inc. v. Holder, 365 F. App’x 817 (9th Cir. 2010) (government seizure of marijuana);
La Voz Radio de la Communidad v. FCC, 223 F.3d 313 (6th Cir. 2000) (radio broadcasting
without a license); Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (concerning
revocation of tax-exempt status for political advertisements).
107 See RFRA Case Data, supra note 26.
108 See, e.g., Leonard v. U.S. Dep’t of Defense, 598 F. App’x 9 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (con-
cerning inability to lead religious services during federal government shutdown), cert. denied,
136 S. Ct. 261 (2015); Stratton v. Mecklenburg Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 521 F. App’x 278
(4th Cir. 2013) (concerning termination of parental rights), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1290
(2014); Seven-Sky v. Holder, 661 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (concerning insurance mandate
in the Affordable Care Act), cert. denied, 567 U.S. 951 (2012); Muhammad v. Ahern, 350
F. App’x 529 (2d Cir. 2009) (border searches at airport arrivals); Larsen v. U.S. Navy, 525
F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (concerning the use of quotas in appointing Navy chaplains), cert.
denied, 555 U.S. 1071 (2008); Fernandez v. Mukasey, 520 F.3d 965 (9th Cir. 2008) (con-
cerning removal pursuant to immigration laws); Tabbaa v. Chertoff, 509 F.3d 89 (2d Cir.
2007) (concerning border searches at U.S.-Canada border); Droz v. Comm’r, 48 F.3d 1120
(9th Cir. 1995) (payment of Social Security taxes), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1042 (1996).
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educational institutions, and religious and business organizations.109 Seven of the eight
land-use claims involved places of worship or individuals.110 There was one claim
based upon education.111 The subject matter of claims by identity of the claimant and
as a percentage of the claims filed in appellate courts are summarized in Table 7 below.
Table 7: Subject Matter of Claims in U.S. Appellate Courts by Identity of the
Claimant
CLAIMANT TYPE OF CLAIM CLAIMS PERCENTAGE
Incarcerated individuals Conditions of confinement 30 30.6%
Incarcerated individuals Crime/tort defense 19 19.4%
Private individuals Religious expression 18 18.4%
Private individuals Legal processes 8 8.2%
Private individuals Land use 3 3.1%
Private individuals Education 1 1.0%
109 See Wheaton Coll. v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2806 (2014) (concerning contraception man-
date in the Affordable Care Act); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014)
(concerning contraception mandate in the Affordable Care Act); Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita
Beneficente União Do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006) (concerning seizure of hoasca utilized
in religious rituals); Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Lew, 733 F.3d 72 (4th Cir. 2013) (concerning in-
dividual and employer insurance mandates in the Affordable Care Act), cert. denied, 134 S.
Ct. 683 (2013); Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156 (D.C. Cir.
2003) (concerning designation of Islamic charity as a terrorist organization), cert. denied,
540 U.S. 1218 (2004); United States v. Indianapolis Baptist Temple, 224 F.3d 627 (7th Cir.
2000) (concerning failure to pay employment tax), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1112 (2001); In re
Young, 141 F.3d 854 (8th Cir. 1998) (concerning recovery of tithes from church in bank-
ruptcy proceeding), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 811 (1998).
110 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (concerning denial of building permit);
Oklevueha Native Am. Church of Hawaii, Inc. v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir. 2016)
(concerning marijuana cultivation), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 510 (2016); St. John’s United
Church of Christ v. FAA, 550 F.3d 1168 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (concerning relocation of cemetery
to facilitate airport expansion), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 820 (2009); Snoqualmie Indian Tribe
v. FERC, 545 F.3d 1207 (9th Cir. 2008) (concerning physical access to sacred site); Navajo
Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2008) (concerning waste water disposal
on sacred site), cert. denied, 556 U.S. 1281 (2009); Kiczenski v. Gonzales, 237 F. App’x 149
(9th Cir. 2007) (concerning hemp cultivation); Vill. of Bensenville v. FAA, 457 F.3d 52
(D.C. Cir. 2006) (concerning relocation of cemetery to facilitate airport expansion). One land-
use claim was filed by a non-profit organization. See La Cuna de Aztlán Sacred Sites Prot.
Circle Advisory Comm. v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 603 F. App’x 651 (9th Cir. 2015) (concerning
access to sacred sites), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2407 (2016).
111 See Gary S. v. Manchester Sch. Dist., 374 F.3d 15 (1st Cir. 2004) (concerning failure
to provide equal services to disabled children in religious schools), cert. denied, 543 U.S.
988 (2004).
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CLAIMANT TYPE OF CLAIM CLAIMS PERCENTAGE
Private individuals Crime/tort defense 1 1.0%
Places of worship Land use 4 4.1%
Places of worship Religious expression 3 3.1%
Places of worship Legal processes 3 3.1%
Places of worship Crime/tort defense 1 1.0%
Religious organizations Religious expression 2 2.0%
Religious organizations Legal processes 1 1.0%
Educational organizations Legal processes 2 2.0%
Non-profit organizations Land use 1 1.0%
Business organizations Legal processes 1 1.0%
Total 98 100.0%
The prevalence of claims arising from conditions of confinement, the crime and
tort defense, and religious expression is also apparent in the composite of appellate
claims by subject matter. It is notable that 75.5% of cases concerned one of these three
claims.112 Another 15.3% of claims related to legal processes.113 Claims relating to
land-use issues and education were a minority at 8.2% and 1.0%, respectively.114 Only
two cases involved the LGBTQ+ community, a group whose assertion of rights has
motivated both sides in recent RFRA debates.115 The composite of claims by subject
matter in appellate courts is summarized in Table 8 below.
Table 8: Claims in U.S. Appellate Courts by Subject Matter
TYPE OF CLAIM CLAIMS PERCENTAGE
Conditions of confinement 30 30.6%
Religious expression 23 23.5%
Crime/tort defense 21 21.4%
Legal processes 15 15.3%
Land use 8 8.2%
Education 1 1.0%
Total 98 100.0%
112 See supra notes 101–06 and accompanying text.
113 See supra notes 108–09 and accompanying text.
114 See supra notes 110–11 and accompanying text.
115 See Wilson v. James, No. 13-CV-01351, 2016 WL 3043746 (D.C. Cir. May 17, 2016)
(concerning use of government account by member of air national guard to object to same-sex
marriage), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 695 (2017); Walden v. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Pre-
vention, 669 F.3d 1277 (11th Cir. 2012) (concerning refusal to provide counseling services
to same-sex couples); see also Brammer, supra note 13; Koppelman, supra note 14; Knauer,
supra note 19; Day & Weatherby, supra note 20, at 911–12; Koppelman, supra note 21.
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Chart 8
2. Subject Matter of Claims in U.S. District Courts
Conditions of confinement, religious expression, and the crime and tort defense
were the most common claims addressed by district courts.116 Conditions of confinement
claims were more common in district courts than their appellate counterparts, account-
ing for more than half of all opinions.117 The remaining claims by incarcerated individ-
uals, an additional 10.2% of claims, implicated the crime and tort defense category.118
116 See RFRA Case Data, supra note 26.
117 The one hundred and six claims based upon conditions of confinement were divided
among district courts in the following circuits: Fourth and Fifth Circuits (seventeen claims
each); Third Circuit (fourteen claims); Seventh Circuit (thirteen claims); D.C. and Ninth
Circuits (nine claims each); Tenth Circuit (eight claims); Second Circuit (seven claims); Sixth
Circuit (six claims); Eleventh Circuit (three claims); Eighth Circuit (two claims); and First
Circuit (one claim). See RFRA Case Data, supra note 26.
118 The twenty-one crime and tort defense claims by incarcerated individuals were allocated
among district courts in the following circuits: Tenth Circuit (five claims); Ninth Circuit (four
claims); First, Third, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits (two claims each); and Second, Fourth, Fifth,
and Eleventh Circuits (one claim each). See RFRA Case Data, supra note 26. Three of the
remaining nine crime and tort defense claims were brought by religious organizations. See
United States v. Phila. Yearly Meeting of Religious Soc’y of Friends, 322 F. Supp. 2d 603
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Religious expression claims were the second most common claim in district courts
constituting 15.6% of all claims.119 The majority of these claims (68.7%) were as-
serted by individuals.120 The subject matter of these claims was as diverse as their
appellate counterparts.121 The remaining religious expression claims involved places
of worship and non-profit, religious, and business organizations.122
(E.D. Pa. 2004) (concerning refusal to honor levy on employee for unpaid income taxes);
United States v. Any & All Radio Station Transmission Equip., No. 00-Civ.-893 (GBD), 2004
WL 2848532 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 9, 2004) (concerning forfeiture of transmission equipment utilized
by an unlicensed radio station); United States v. Any & All Radio Station Transmission Equip.,
No. Civ. A. 99-2260, 1999 WL 718646 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 31, 1999) (concerning forfeiture of
transmission equipment utilized by an unlicensed radio station). Individuals and non-profit
organizations utilized the crime and tort defense on two occasions each. See United States
v. Berst, No. 6:11-cv-6370-TC, 2012 WL 4361408 (D. Or. Aug. 2, 2012) (misbranded alterna-
tive herbal medicines); United States v. Islamic Am. Relief Agency, No. 07-00087-CR-W-NKL,
2009 WL 4016478 (W.D. Mo. Nov. 18, 2009) (export control violations); Off. of Foreign
Assets Control v. Voices in Wilderness, 329 F. Supp. 2d 71 (D.D.C. 2004) (export control
violations); In re Three Children, 24 F. Supp. 2d 389 (D.N.J. 1998) (concerning a motion to
quash subpoena). Educational institutions and business organizations utilized the crime and
tort defense on one occasion each. See Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. R.G. & G.R.
Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 3d 837 (E.D. Mich. 2016) (concerning wrongful
discharge of transgender employee); Goodman v. Archbishop Curley High Sch., Inc., 149
F. Supp. 3d 577 (D. Md. 2016) (concerning the sexual abuse of a student).
119 See RFRA Case Data, supra note 26.
120 The twenty-two religious expression claims brought by individuals were allocated among
district courts in the following circuits: D.C. Circuit (five claims); Eighth Circuit (three claims);
Second, Third, Fourth, Ninth and Tenth Circuits (two claims each); First, Fifth, Seventh and
Eleventh Circuits (one claim each). See RFRA Case Data, supra note 26.
121 See, e.g., Singh v. McConville, 187 F. Supp. 3d 152 (D.D.C. 2016) (concerning military
grooming policy as applied to Sikhs); Abeles v. Metro. Wash. Airports Auth., No. 1:15-cv-
00792, 2016 WL 6892103 (E.D. Va. Apr. 1, 2016) (concerning leave policy for religious
activities); Heap v. Carter, 112 F. Supp. 3d 402 (E.D. Va. 2015) (concerning plaintiff’s re-
jection as a Navy chaplain); Tagore v. United States, No. H-09-0027, 2014 WL 2880008 (S.D.
Tex. June 24, 2014) (concerning the right to carry ceremonial sword in the workplace); Gover
v. United States, No. 08-5207, 2009 WL 754692 (W.D. Ark. Mar. 19, 2009) (marijuana
possession); Loop v. United States, No. 05-575, 2006 WL 1851140 (D. Minn. June 30, 2006)
(marijuana use); Rylee v. Ashcroft, No. CIVS05-0068 DFLCMK, 2005 WL 3309348 (E.D.
Cal. Dec. 5, 2005) (marijuana possession); Newdow v. Bush, 355 F. Supp. 2d 265 (D.D.C.
2005) (concerning objection to prayer at the presidential inauguration); Utah v. Evans, 143
F. Supp. 2d 1290 (D. Utah 2001) (concerning failure to include missionaries in U.S. Census);
Packard v. United States, 7 F. Supp. 2d 143 (D. Conn. 1998) (concerning an objection to
payment of income taxes); Rigdon v. Perry, 962 F. Supp. 2d 150 (D.D.C. 1997) (concerning
ban on anti-abortion activities by military chaplains); Planned Parenthood Ass’n of South-
eastern Pa., Inc. v. Walton, 949 F. Supp. 290 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (anti-abortion protest); United
States v. Dinwiddie, 885 F. Supp. 1286 (W.D. Mo. 1995) (concerning threats toward and
blockade of abortion clinic); United States v. Brock, 863 F. Supp. 851 (E.D. Wis. 1994) (anti-
abortion protest).
122 See Comité Fiestas de la Calle San Sebastián, Inc. v. Cruz, 207 F. Supp. 3d 129 (D.P.R.
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Objections to legal processes were 13.7% of district court claims.123 Claims by in-
dividuals were far more prevalent than their appellate counterparts, constituting 82.1%
of such claims.124 The remaining legal processes claims were asserted by places of 
Sept. 13, 2016) (concerning participation in a religious festival); Mathis v. Christian Heating
& Air Conditioning, Inc., 158 F. Supp. 3d 317 (E.D. Pa. 2016) (concerning an objection to
religious message on company name badge); In re Nichols, No. TDC-14-0625, 2014 WL
4094340 (D. Md. Aug. 15, 2014) (concerning status of donations to church in bankruptcy
proceeding); Penn v. N.Y. Methodist Hosp., No. 11-cv-9137 (NSR), 2013 WL 5477600
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2013) (employment discrimination); Church of Holy Light of the Queen
v. Holder, No. 1:08-cv-3095-PA, 2012 WL 5985122 (D. Or. Nov. 29, 2012) (concerning
possession and consumption of “Daime” tea containing a controlled substance); Care Net
Pregnancy Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 896 F. Supp. 2d 98 (D.D.C. Oct. 10, 2012) (con-
cerning access to government loans); Council for Life Coal. v. Reno, 856 F. Supp. 1422
(S.D. Cal. 1994) (concerning an anti-abortion protest); Secs. Inv’r Prot. Corp. v. Bernard L.
Madoff Inv. Secs., LLC, 531 B.R. 439 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2015) (concerning objection to
clawback); In re Bloch, 207 B.R. 944 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1997) (concerning the status of tithes
in bankruptcy proceeding); In re Newman, 203 B.R. 468 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1996) (concerning
the status of tithes in bankruptcy proceeding).
123 See RFRA Case Data, supra note 26.
124 See New Doe Child #1 v. Cong. of United States, No. 5:16CV59, 2016 WL 6995358
(N.D. Ohio Nov. 30, 2016) (concerning reference to God on currency); Tanvir v. Lynch, 128
F. Supp. 3d 756 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 2015), rev’d on procedural grounds, Tanvir v. Tanzin,
2018 WL 3096962 (2d Cir. May 2, 2018) (concerning plaintiffs’ inclusion on federal no-fly
list); Miller v. Davis, 123 F. Supp. 3d 924 (E.D. Ky. Aug. 12, 2015) (concerning government
official’s refusal to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples); Howe v. Burwell, No. 2:15-
CV-6, 2015 WL 4479757 (D. Vt. July 21, 2015) (concerning utilization of funds pursuant to
the Affordable Care Act); United States v. Town of Colorado City, No. 3:12-cv-8123-HRH,
2014 WL 5465104 (D. Ariz. Oct. 28, 2014) (concerning an objection to compelled deposition);
Carmichael v. Sebelius, No. 3:13CV129, 2013 WL 5755618 (E.D. Va. Oct. 23, 2013) (con-
cerning required utilization of Social Security number); Cherri v. Mueller, 951 F. Supp. 2d
918 (E.D. Mich. 2013) (concerning searches, detentions, and questioning of Muslims at U.S.-
Canadian border); Fazaga v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, 884 F. Supp. 2d 1022 (C.D. Cal.
Aug. 14, 2012) (concerning surveillance by law enforcement); Leitgeb v. S.C. Dep’t of Motor
Vehicles, No. 7:10-2989-TMC, 2011 WL 5878157 (D.S.C. Nov. 23, 2011) (concerning
required utilization of Social Security number); Jacobrown v. United States, 764 F. Supp. 2d
221 (D.D.C. 2011) (concerning an objection to Selective Service registration); Moore-
Backman v. United States, No. CV 09-397-TUC-RCC, 2010 WL 3342106 (D. Ariz. Aug.
25, 2010) (concerning payment of federal income taxes); Muhammad v. Bonner, No. 05-CV-
1851(RJD)(LB), 2008 WL 926574 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2008) (concerning detention and
search of luggage at airport); Wong v. Beebe, No. 01-718-ST, 2007 WL 1170621 (D. Or.
Apr. 10, 2007), rev’d, Kwai Fun Wong v. Beebe, 381 F. App’x 715 (9th Cir. 2010) (con-
cerning strip search by Immigration & Naturalization Service agents); Marrero v. Apfel, 87
F. Supp. 2d 340 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (concerning entitlement to disability payments); Lipton v.
Peters, No. CIV.SA-99-CA-0235-EP, 1999 WL 33289705 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 12, 1999) 
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worship, a non-profit organization, and an educational institution.125 The remaining
nine district court claims involved land-use and education issues.126 Six of the seven
land-use claims were brought by individuals.127 The two education claims were
asserted by an individual and an educational institution.128 The subject matter of
claims by identity of the claimant and as a percentage of the claims in district courts
is summarized in Table 9 below.
(concerning denial of military discharge); In re Hodge, 220 B.R. 386 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1998)
(concerning status of tithes in bankruptcy proceeding); Tinsley v. Comm’r, No. 396-CV-
1769-P, 1998 WL 59481 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 9, 1998) (concerning request pursuant to Freedom
of Information Act); Steckler v. United States, No. Civ.A. 96-1054, 1998 WL 28235 (E.D.
La. Jan. 26, 1998) (concerning required utilization of Social Security number); Kennedy v.
Rubin, No. C95-1270 SBA, 1995 WL 552148 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 1995) (concerning utili-
zation of federal income tax proceeds for military); In re Gomes, 219 B.R. 286 (Bankr. D.
Or. 1998) (concerning status of tithes in bankruptcy proceeding); In re Andrade, 213 B.R.
765 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1997) (concerning status of tithes in bankruptcy proceeding); In re
Turner, 193 B.R. 548 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1996) (concerning disclosure of Social Security
number in bankruptcy proceeding); In re Faulkner, 165 B.R. 644 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1994)
(concerning status of tithes in bankruptcy proceeding).
125 See Iglesia Pentecostal Casa de Dios Para Las Naciones, Inc. v. Johnson, No. 15-CV-
2612-DDC-GEB, 2016 WL 3936435 (D. Kan. July 21, 2016) (concerning denial of immigrant
visa petition); Gen. Conference Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists v. McGill, No. 1:06-cv-
01207-JDB-egb, 2012 WL 1155465 (W.D. Tenn. Apr. 5, 2012) (concerning objection to
enforcement of contempt citation); Alliance for Bio-Integrity v. Shalala, 116 F. Supp. 2d 166
(D.D.C. 2000) (concerning labeling of genetically modified foods); Fordham Univ. v. Brown,
856 F. Supp. 684 (D.D.C. 1994) (concerning denial of radio broadcasting license); In re Roman
Catholic Archbishop of Portland, 335 B.R. 842 (Bankr. D. Or. 2005) (concerning objection
to sale of church property).
126 See RFRA Case Data, supra note 26.
127 See Cherokee Nation W. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, No. 14-CV-612-JED-TLW,
2016 WL 4548441 (N.D. Okla. Aug. 31, 2016) (concerning access to federal land for
religious ceremony); Battle Mountain Band v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., No. 3:16-CV-
0268-LRH-WGC, 2016 WL 4497756 (D. Nev. Aug. 26, 2016) (concerning construction on
sacred land); Armstrong v. Jewell, No. 15-215-ML, 2015 WL 8160721 (D.R.I. Dec. 7, 2015)
(marijuana use in a national park); Winnemem Wintu Tribe v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 725 F.
Supp. 2d 1119 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (concerning access to sacred sites located on federal land);
Comanche Nation v. United States, No. CIV-08-849-D, 2008 WL 4426621 (W.D. Okla.
Sept. 23, 2008) (concerning construction on sacred land); Nenninger v. U.S. Forest Serv.,
No. 07-3028, 2008 WL 2693186 (W.D. Ark. July 3, 2008) (concerning use permit for
national forest). The sole land-use claim not involving a private individual concerned a
religious organization. See C.L.U.B. v. City of Chicago, 157 F. Supp. 2d 903 (N.D. Ill. 2001)
(concerning requirement of a special-use permit to operate a church in a commercial zone).
128 See Smith v. Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Educ., No. 3:15-CV-57(GROH), 2015 WL 5031666
(N.D.W. Va. Aug. 25, 2015) (teaching of evolution in public schools); In re Scroggins, 209
B.R. 727 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1997) (refusal to issue academic transcripts).
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Table 9: Subject Matter of Claims in U.S. District Courts by Identity of the
Claimant
CLAIMANT TYPE OF CLAIM NUMBER PERCENTAGE
Incarcerated individuals Conditions of confinement 106 51.7%
Incarcerated individuals Crime/tort defense 21 10.2%
Private individuals Legal processes 23 11.2%
Private individuals Religious expression 22 10.7%
Private individuals Land use 6 2.9%
Private individuals Crime/tort defense 2 1.0%
Private individuals Education 1 0.5%
Places of worship Religious expression 5 2.4%
Places of worship Legal processes 3 1.5%
Non-profit organizations Religious expression 3 1.5%
Non-profit organizations Crime/tort defense 2 1.0%
Non-profit organizations Legal processes 1 0.5%
Religious organizations Crime/tort defense 3 1.5%
Religious organizations Land use 1 0.5%
Religious organizations Religious expression 1 0.5%
Educational institutions Legal processes 1 0.5%
Educational institutions Education 1 0.5%
Educational institutions Crime/tort defense 1 0.5%
Business organizations Religious expression 1 0.5%
Business organizations Crime/tort defense 1 0.5%
Total 205 100.1%
The prevalence of claims concerning conditions of confinement, religious expres-
sion, and the crime and tort defense is also apparent in the composite of district court
claims by subject matter.129 Almost 82.0% of district court claims, one hundred and
sixty-eight claims in all, are classifiable under one of these three headings.130 The
disparity is more pronounced when legal processes claims are factored into the equa-
tion, with 95.6% of district court claims arising from one of these four classifications.131
Only 4.4% of district court claims, nine cases in total, arose from land use or educa-
tion.132 Furthermore, only two cases involved the LGBTQ+ community.133 The com-
posite of claims by subject matter in district courts is summarized in Table 10 below.
129 See supra Table 9; RFRA Case Data, supra note 26.
130 See supra notes 117–22 and accompanying text.
131 See supra notes 117–25 and accompanying text.
132 See supra notes 127–28 and accompanying text.
133 See Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 201
F. Supp. 3d 837 (E.D. Mich. 2016); Miller v. Davis, 123 F. Supp. 3d 924 (E.D. Ky. 2015).
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Table 10: Claims in U.S. District Courts by Subject Matter
TYPE OF CLAIM NUMBER PERCENTAGE
Conditions of confinement 106 51.7%
Religious expression 32 15.6%
Crime/tort defense 30 14.6%
Legal processes 28 13.7%
Land use 7 3.4%
Education 2 1.0%
Total 205 100.0%
Chart 10
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3. Composite Subject Matter of Claims
Two hundred and forty-two claims, almost 80% of the combined appellate and
district court cases, were based upon conditions of confinement, religious expression,
or the crime and tort defense.134 This dominance is reflected in the circuit-by-circuit
data. Conditions of confinement prevailed in the D.C., Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth,
Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits.135 Religious expression claims or the crime and
tort defense were the second most common claim in six of these circuits.136 Religious
expression and the crime and tort defense were equally split in the First Circuit, at
28.6% of all claims.137 The crime and tort defense was the most common claim in
the Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits.138 The second most common claim in these
circuits was divided between religious expression, legal processes, and conditions
of confinement.139
Objections to legal processes constituted 14.2% of all claims, with the remaining
6.0% split among land-use and education claims.140 Only 1.3% of all claims, four
cases in total, related to the LGBTQ+ community.141 The subject matter of claims by
identity of the claimant and as a percentage of the claims filed in appellate and district
courts is summarized in Table 11 below. The composite of claims by subject matter
in appellate and district courts is summarized in Table 12 below.
134 See supra notes 101–06, 117–22 and accompanying text.
135 Conditions of confinement constituted 40.5% of thirty-seven claims in the D.C. Circuit,
37.5% of twenty-four claims in the Second Circuit, 72.7% of thirty-three claims in the Third
Circuit, 64.3% of twenty-eight claims in the Fourth Circuit, 69.2% of twenty-six claims in
the Fifth Circuit, 46.7% of fifteen claims in the Sixth Circuit, 80.0% of twenty claims in the
Seventh Circuit, and 50.0% of twelve claims in the Eleventh Circuit. See supra notes 101,
117 and accompanying text.
136 Religious expression claims were 32.4% of claims in the D.C. Circuit, 29.2% of claims
in the Second Circuit, 11.5% of claims in the Fifth Circuit, 10.0% of claims in the Seventh
Circuit, and 33.3% of claims in the Eleventh Circuit. See supra notes 104–06, 118–21, and
accompanying text. The crime and tort defense constituted 21.2% of claims in the Third
Circuit. See supra notes 102, 118, and accompanying text. Legal processes claims constituted
the second most common claim in the Fourth Circuit (14.3%) and the Sixth Circuit (26.7%).
See supra notes 108–09 and accompanying text.
137 See Dhooge, State RFRAs, supra note 47, at 606; supra notes 101–02 and accom-
panying text.
138 See Dhooge, State RFRAs, supra note 47, at 606; supra notes 101–02 and accom-
panying text. Claims based upon the crime and tort defense constituted 35.3% of seventeen
claims in the Eighth Circuit, 25.9% of fifty-four claims in the Ninth Circuit, and 38.5% of
twenty-six claims in the Tenth Circuit. See RFRA Case Data, supra note 26.
139 Religious expression claims were 29.4% of claims in the Eighth Circuit; claims based
upon legal processes were 22.2% of claims in the Ninth Circuit; and conditions of confinement
accounted for 34.6% of claims in the Tenth Circuit. See RFRA Case Data, supra note 26.
140 See supra notes 124–25 and accompanying text.
141 See supra note 115 and accompanying text; see also Dhooge, Public Accommodation
Statutes and Sexual Orientation, supra note 21.
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Table 11: Subject Matter of Claims in All Federal Courts by Identity of the
Claimant
CLAIMANT TYPE OF CLAIM NUMBER PERCENTAGE
Incarcerated individuals Conditions of confinement 136 44.9%
Incarcerated individuals Crime/tort defense 40 13.2%
Private individuals Religious expression 40 13.2%
Private individuals Legal processes 31 10.2%
Private individuals Land use 9 3.0%
Private individuals Crime/tort defense 3 1.0%
Private individuals Education 2 0.7%
Places of worship Religious expression 8 2.6%
Places of worship Legal processes 6 2.0%
Places of worship Land use 4 1.3%
Places of worship Crime/tort defense 1 0.3%
Non-profit organizations Religious expression 3 1.0%
Non-profit organizations Crime/tort defense 2 0.7%
Non-profit organizations Legal processes 1 0.3%
Non-profit organizations Land use 1 0.3%
Religious organizations Crime/tort defense 3 1.0%
Religious organizations Religious expression 3 1.0%
Religious organizations Legal processes 1 0.3%
Religious organizations Land use 1 0.3%
Educational institutions Legal processes 3 1.0%
Educational institutions Education 1 0.3%
Educational institutions Crime/tort defense 1 0.3%
Business organizations Legal processes 1 0.3%
Business organizations Religious expression 1 0.3%
Business organizations Crime/tort defense 1 0.3%
Total 303 99.8%
Table 12: Claims in All Federal Courts by Subject Matter
TYPE OF CLAIM NUMBER PERCENTAGE
Conditions of confinement 136 44.9%
Religious 55 18.1%
Crime/tort defense 51 16.8%
Legal processes 43 14.2%
Land use 15 5.0%
Education 3 1.0%
Total 303 100.0%
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Chart 12
These statistics were unsurprising given the previously discussed allocations by
claim in appellate and district courts.142 There were three additional expected findings.
First, the absence of a significant number of land-use cases was expected, given the
nonapplicability of RFRA to state and local governments, which bear considerable
responsibility for actions that may result in such claims.143 The second expected find-
ing was the dearth of claims by educational institutions and business organizations.144
Educational institutions accounted for three claims relating to legal processes, and
one claim each relating to education and the crime and tort defense.145 Business
organizations utilized RFRA on three occasions relating to legal processes, religious
expression, and the crime and tort defense, a mere 1.0% of the sample, thus undercut-
ting the fear that the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores,
142 See supra Sections D.1–D.3; Tables 9, 10, 11 & 12.
143 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532–36 (1997) (holding that RFRA violated
Congress’s power pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment by expanding the coverage of the
First Amendment in contravention of the states’ authority to regulate the welfare of its citizens).
144 See supra notes 109, 118, 122, 125, 128 and accompanying text.
145 See supra notes 109, 118, 125, 128 and accompanying text.
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Inc. provides such organizations with a ready-made weapon with which to engage
in widespread discrimination.146
The third expected finding was the utilization of RFRA as a defense to criminal
or tortuous behavior. Although the crime and tort defense was the third most common
type of claim after conditions of confinement and religious expression, forty of the
fifty-one claims (78.4%) concerned incarcerated individuals.147 The crime and tort
defense was a mere 3.5% of the eighty-five claims asserted by private individuals,
and 5.3% of the nineteen claims brought by places of worship.148 These percentages
increased significantly in the case of business, non-profit, and religious organizations,
and educational institutions, but only represent a total of seven claims.149 Perhaps
the only unexpected result was the utilization of the crime and tort defense by every
class of claimant.150
A related measure is whether claims utilized RFRA in an offensive or defensive
manner. Offensive utilization refers to a claimant’s utilization of RFRA as a means
to challenge a federal statute, regulation, or decision. Defensive utilization refers to
a claimant’s utilization of RFRA as a shield to civil claims or criminal charges brought
by private parties or the federal government in administrative and judicial proceed-
ings. The majority of utilizations would be expected to be offensive, given the larger
number of instances to which such utilizations might be applicable.151 Defensive utili-
zations apply to a narrower set of circumstances and would thus be expected to be
smaller in number.152
An initial comparison is between offensive or defensive utilization and the iden-
tity of claimants. Offensive and defensive utilization by identity of the claimant is
summarized in Table 13 below.
Table 13: Offensive and Defensive Utilization by Identity of the Claimant in
All Federal Courts
CLAIMANT OFFENSIVE DEFENSIVE OFFENSIVE / DEFENSIVE
Incarcerated individuals 133 43 75.6% / 24.4%
Private individuals 69 16 81.2% / 18.8%
Places of worship 11 8 57.9% / 42.1%
146 See supra notes 109, 118, 122 and accompanying text.
147 See supra notes 102, 118 and accompanying text.
148 See supra notes 102, 118 and accompanying text.
149 The crime and tort defense constituted 37.5% of claims brought by religious organi-
zations, 33.3% of claims brought by business organizations and educational institutions, and
28.6% of claims brought by non-profit organizations. See supra notes 102, 118 and accom-
panying text.
150 See supra Table 9; RFRA Case Data, supra note 26.
151 See infra Table 13; RFRA Case Data, supra note 26.
152 See infra Table 13; RFRA Case Data, supra note 26.
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CLAIMANT OFFENSIVE DEFENSIVE OFFENSIVE / DEFENSIVE
Religious organizations 4 4 50.0% / 50.0%
Non-profit organizations 5 2 71.4% / 28.6%
Educational institutions 3 2 60.0% / 40.0%
Business organizations 1 2 33.3% / 66.7%
Total 226 77 74.6% / 25.4%
Unsurprisingly, 55.8% of defensive utilizations involved incarcerated individ-
uals.153 It is equally unsurprising that private individuals were the largest utilizer of
RFRA for defensive purposes outside of incarcerated individuals, with claims consti-
tuting 20.8% of defensive uses.154 These claims were 47% of defensive utilizations
by nonincarcerated claimants and 5.3% of opinions within the sample.155
Although defensive utilization of RFRA as a percentage of claims was much
higher for claimants other than private individuals, the number of utilizations overall
was significantly lower. Places of worship utilized RFRA defensively on eight occa-
sions, which constituted 10.4% of defensive uses.156 Religious organizations utilized
153 See supra Table 13; RFRA Case Data, supra note 26.
154 See supra Table 13; Adams v. Comm’r, 170 F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 1999) (concerning an
objection to payment of federal income taxes); Miller v. Davis, 123 F. Supp. 3d 924 (E.D.
Ky. 2015); United States v. Town of Colorado City, No. 3:12-cv-8123-HRH, 2014 WL
5465104 (D. Ariz. Oct. 28, 2014); United States v. Dillard, No. 11-1098-JTM, 2012 WL
5505201 (D. Kan. Nov. 13, 2012) (concerning threats directed at abortion provider); United
States v. Berst, No. 6:11-cv-6370-TC, 2012 WL 4361408 (D. Or. Aug. 2, 2012); In re Three
Children, 24 F. Supp. 2d 389 (D.N.J. 1998); In re Hodge, 220 B.R. 386 (D. Idaho 1998);
Planned Parenthood Ass’n of Southeastern Pa., Inc. v. Walton, 949 F. Supp. 290 (E.D. Pa.
1996); United States v. Brock, 863 F. Supp. 851 (E.D. Wis. 1994); In re Khan, No. 10-
46901-ess, 2014 WL 10474969 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Dec. 24, 2014) (concerning an objection
to clawback); In re C.F. Foods, Inc., No. CIV.A. 01-2849, 2001 WL 1632272 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
Dec. 20, 2001) (concerning status of contributions in bankruptcy proceeding); In re Gomes, 219
B.R. 286 (Bankr. D. Or. 1998); In re Saunders, 215 B.R. 800 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1997) (con-
cerning tithing during bankruptcy proceedings); In re Andrade, 213 B.R. 765 (Bankr. E.D. Cal.
1997); In re Turner, 193 B.R. 548 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1996); In re Faulkner, 165 B.R. 644
(Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1994); see also supra notes 102, 118, 121, 124 and accompanying text.
155 See supra Table 13.
156 See supra Table 13; Gonzales v. O Centro Espírita Beneficente União do Vegetal, 546
U.S. 418 (2006); In re Grand Jury Empaneling of Special Grand Jury, 171 F.3d 826 (3d Cir.
1999) (concerning an objection to a subpoena); In re Young, 141 F.3d 854 (8th Cir. 1998);
In re Nichols, No. TDC-14-0625, 2014 WL 4094340 (D. Md. Aug. 15, 2014); Gen. Con-
ference Corp. of Seventh-day Adventists v. McGill, No. 1:06-cv-01207-JDB-egb, 2012 WL
1155465 (W.D. Tenn. Apr. 5, 2012); In re Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland, 335
B.R. 842 (Bankr. D. Or. 2005); In re Bloch, 207 B.R. 944 (D. Colo. 1997) (concerning status
of tithes in bankruptcy proceeding); In re Newman, 203 B.R. 468 (D. Kan. 1996); see also
supra notes 109, 122, 125 and accompanying text. Defensive utilization by places of worship
was 23.5% of defensive utilizations by nonincarcerated claimants and 2.6% of opinions within
the sample. See supra Table 13.
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RFRA defensively on four occasions, which constituted 5.2% of defensive uses.157
The four combined defensive utilizations by non-profit organizations and educa-
tional institutions also constituted 5.2% of defensive uses.158 Business organizations
were the only claimant that had more defensive than offensive utilizations.159
A second comparison is between types of utilization and claims. Offensive and
defensive utilization by type of claim is summarized in Table 14 below.
Table 14: Offensive and Defensive Utilization by Type of Claim in All Federal
Courts
CLAIM OFFENSIVE DEFENSIVE
OFFENSIVE/
DEFENSIVE
Conditions of confinement 131 5 96.3% / 3.7%
Religious expression 44 11 80.0% / 20.0%
Crime/tort defense 2 49 3.9% / 96.1%
Legal processes 32 11 74.4% / 25.6%
Land use 15 0 100.0% / 0.0%
Education 2 1 66.7% / 33.3%
Total 226 77 74.6% / 25.4%
Offensive utilization predominated in all types of claims except, unremarkably,
for the crime and tort defense.160 Defensive utilization of the crime and tort defense
157 See supra Table 13; United States v. Any & All Radio Station Transmission Equip.,
No. 00 Civ. 893 (GBD), 2004 WL 2848532 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 9, 2004); United States v. Phila.
Yearly Meeting of the Religious Soc’y of Friends, 322 F. Supp. 2d 603 (E.D. Pa. 2004); United
States v. Any & All Radio Station Transmission Equip., No. Civ.A. 99-2260, 1999 WL 718646
(E.D. Pa. Aug. 31, 1999); Secs. Inv’r Prot. Corp. v. Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Secs., LLC, 531
B.R. 439 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2015); see also supra notes 118, 122 and accompanying text.
Defensive utilization by religious organizations were 11.8% of defensive utilizations by non-
incarcerated claimants and 1.3% of opinions within the sample. See supra Table 13.
158 See supra Table 13; Goodman v. Archbishop Curley High Sch., Inc., 149 F. Supp. 3d
577 (D. Md. 2016); United States v. Islamic Am. Relief Agency, No. 07-00087-CR-W-NKL,
2009 WL 4016478 (W.D. Mo. Nov. 18, 2009); Office of Foreign Assets Control v. Voices in
Wilderness, 329 F. Supp. 2d 71 (D.D.C. 2004); In re Scroggins, 209 B.R. 727 (Bankr. D. Ariz.
1997); see also supra notes 118, 128 and accompanying text. Defensive utilization by non-
profit organizations and educational institutions constituted 11.8% of defensive utilizations
by nonincarcerated claimants and 1.3% of opinions within the sample. See supra Table 13.
159 See supra Table 13; Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral
Homes, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 3d 837 (E.D. Mich. 2016); Mathis v. Christian Heating & Air
Conditioning, Inc., 158 F. Supp. 3d 317 (E.D. Pa. 2016); see also supra notes 118, 122 and
accompanying text.
160 Defensive utilization of the crime and tort defense constituted 96.1% of such claims
and 63.6% of total defensive uses. See supra Table 14. The sample included two instances
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made up 68.0% of defensive uses not associated with conditions of confinement and
16.2% of all claims.161 Thirty-eight of the forty-nine opinions (77.5%) in which the
crime and tort defense was utilized defensively involved incarcerated individuals.162
These opinions addressed a broad range of claims.163 The remaining claims were
divided between private individuals and religious organizations (three claims each);
non-profit organizations (two claims); and places of worship, educational institutions,
and business organizations (one claim each).164 Conversely, offensive utilization of
conditions of confinement constituted 96.3% of such claims, and there were only five
instances in which this claim was utilized in a defensive manner.165
of offensive use of the crime and tort defense. See Farfan v. United States, No. 15-61772-CIV-
ZLOCH, 2015 WL 7568173 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 24, 2015) (concerning a wrongful conviction);
Williams v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No. 08-2631-KHV, 2009 WL 1313253 (D. Kan. May 12,
2009) (concerning a wrongful conviction).
161 See supra Table 14.
162 See RFRA Case Data, supra note 26.
163 See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 502 F.3d 931 (9th Cir. 2007) (concerning an ob-
jection to jury instruction on capital punishment); United States v. DeWitt, 95 F.3d 1374 (8th
Cir. 1996) (manufacture of methamphetamines); United States v. Manneh, 645 F. Supp. 2d
98 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (importation of bush meat); United States v. Adeyemo, 624 F. Supp. 2d
1081 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (possession of leopard skins); United States v. Acevedo-Delgado, 167
F. Supp. 2d 477 (D.P.R. 2001) (trespass on a military base). The vast majority of opinions
addressed marijuana-related issues and possession of eagle feathers by Native Americans.
See, e.g., United States v. Comrie, 842 F.3d 348 (5th Cir. 2016) (marijuana possession); United
States v. Vasquez-Ramos, 531 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 2008) (possession of eagle feathers); United
States v. Friday, 525 F.3d 938 (10th Cir. 2008) (possession of eagle feathers); United States
v. Oliver, 255 F.3d 588 (8th Cir. 2001) (possession of eagle feathers); United States v. Bauer,
75 F.3d 1366 (9th Cir. 1996) (marijuana possession); Deegan v. West Virginia, No. 6:12-
CV-00523, 2012 WL 1899668 (S.D.W. Va. Apr. 25, 2012), report and recommendation
adopted, 2012 WL 1899662 (S.D.W. Va. May 24, 2012) (marijuana possession); United States
v. Hardman, 622 F. Supp. 2d 1129 (D. Utah 2009) (possession of eagle feathers); Martin v.
United States, No. 04-73878, 2008 WL 4225835 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 27, 2008) (marijuana
possession); United States v. Brown, No. 07-5037, 2007 WL 2746608 (W.D. Ark. Sept. 18,
2007) (marijuana cultivation); Olsen v. United States, No. 07-34-B-W, 2007 WL 1100457 (D.
Me. Apr. 10, 2007) (marijuana distribution); United States v. Winddancer, 435 F. Supp. 2d 687
(M.D. Tenn. 2006) (possession of eagle feathers); United States v. Forchion, No. 04-949-ALL,
2005 WL 2989604 (E.D. Pa. July 22, 2005) (marijuana possession in a federal park); United
States v. Gonzales, 957 F. Supp. 1225 (D.N.M. 1997) (possession of eagle feathers).
164 See supra notes 154–59 and accompanying text.
165 See supra Table 14; United States v. Israel, 317 F.3d 768 (7th Cir. 2003) (concerning
challenge to conditions for parole); United States v. Girod, No. 5:15-CR-87-DCR-REW-1,
2015 WL 10031958 (E.D. Ky. Dec. 30, 2015) (concerning Amish criminal defendant’s objec-
tion to being photographed by police); United States v. Jefferson, 175 F. Supp. 2d 1123 (N.D.
Ind. 2001) (concerning challenge to conditions for parole); United States v. Valrey, No. CR96-
549Z, 2000 WL 692647 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 22, 2000) (concerning challenge to conditions for
parole); United States v. Marks, 947 F. Supp. 858 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (concerning challenge to
conditions for bail).
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The remaining types of claims were overwhelmingly offensive in nature.166 The
fifteen land-use claims within the sample were offensive utilizations.167 Eighty percent
of religious expression claims, and almost three quarters of legal processes claims
were offensive.168 Offensive utilization of religious expression claims constituted 19.5%
of offensive uses, 46.3% of such uses not associated with conditions of confinement,
and 14.5% of all claims within the sample.169 Offensive claims based upon legal pro-
cesses constituted 14.1% of offensive uses, 33.3% of such uses not associated with
conditions of confinement, and 10.6% of all claims included in the sample.170 Two of
the three education claims were offensive in nature.171
E. Data Point Four: Outcomes
A final means by which to measure RFRA’s impact is through outcomes. A large
number of favorable outcomes would be expected if religious liberty is in need of
the enhanced protection afforded by RFRA.172 These outcomes also may support the
view of RFRA opponents as to its pernicious nature and the need to resist efforts to
expand its reach.173
Outcomes are organized in two categories with each category further divided into
subcategories. The first category (unsuccessful claims) is further subdivided as follows:
(1) termination of a claim pursuant to a motion to dismiss or strike; (2) termination of
a claim pursuant to a motion for summary judgment; (3) termination of a claim pursu-
ant to other miscellaneous motions or judicial actions;174 (4) trial at which a claimant
166 See supra Table 14.
167 See supra notes 110–11 and accompanying text.
168 See supra Table 14.
169 See supra Table 14; see also supra notes 103–04, 119–20 and accompanying text; Ruiz-
Diaz v. United States, 703 F.3d 483 (9th Cir. 2012) (concerning adjustment of visa status for
religious workers); Jenkins v. Comm’r, 483 F.3d 90 (2d Cir. 2007) (concerning objection to
payment of federal income taxes); Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F.3d 1517 (11th Cir. 1995) (concerning
protest at an abortion clinic); Singh v. McHugh, 185 F. Supp. 3d 201 (D.D.C. 2016) (concern-
ing military grooming policy as applied to Sikhs); Singh v. Carter, 168 F. Supp. 3d 216 (D.D.C.
2016) (concerning military grooming policy as applied to Sikhs).
170 See supra Table 14; see also supra notes 108–09, 123–25 and accompanying text;
Leonard v. U.S. Dep’t of Defense, 598 F. App’x 9 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (concerning inability to
lead religious services during federal government shutdown).
171 See Gary S. v. Manchester Sch. Dist., 374 F.3d 15 (1st Cir. 2004) (concerning the pro-
vision of disability benefits and services at a private religious school); Smith v. Jefferson Cty.
Bd. of Educ., No. 3:15-CV-57 (GROH), 2015 WL 5031666 (N.D.W. Va. Aug. 25, 2015)
(concerning the teaching of evolution in public schools); see also supra notes 111, 128 and
accompanying text.
172 See supra notes 11–16 and accompanying text.
173 See supra notes 17–24 and accompanying text.
174 This subcategory includes motions to enforce court orders, issue preliminary injunctions, 
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was unsuccessful;175 and (5) unsuccessful outcomes in criminal cases.176 The second
category (successful claims) is further subdivided as follows: (1) denial of an oppos-
ing party’s motion to dismiss; (2) denial of an opposing party’s motion for summary
judgment; (3) granting of a claimant’s motion for summary judgment; (4) granting re-
lief to a claimant pursuant to other miscellaneous motions or judicial actions; (5) trial
at which a claimant prevailed or remand for trial by an appellate court; and (6) suc-
cessful outcomes in criminal cases.177
1. Outcomes in U.S. Appellate Courts
Sixteen of the ninety-eight cases in appellate courts resulted in successful out-
comes for claimants, for an overall success rate of 16.3%.178 Five courts did not have
a successful claim.179 Success rates varied among the remaining eight courts from
75.0% in the U.S. Supreme Court (out of four claims) to 8.7% in the Ninth Circuit
(out of twenty-three claims).180 The results in appellate courts by type of outcome
are summarized in Table 15 below.
Table 15: Outcomes in U.S. Appellate Courts by Type
SUCCESSFUL NUMBER % SUCCESSFUL % OF ALL CLAIMS
Denial of summary judgment 6 37.5% 6.1%
Miscellaneous motions 3 18.7% 3.1%
Denial of dismissal 2 12.5% 2.0%
Trial 2 12.5% 2.0%
Criminal case 2 12.5% 2.0%
Grant of summary judgment 1 6.3% 1.0%
Total 16 100.0% 16.3%
disregard judicial procedures, and amend pleadings, as well as unsuccessful appeals of admin-
istrative decisions.
175 This subcategory includes verdicts and motions for judgment as a matter of law.
176 This subcategory includes motions to suppress evidence, issue writs of habeas corpus,
strike jury instructions and unsuccessful challenges to criminal convictions.
177 This subcategory includes dismissal of prosecution, vacating conviction, suppression
of evidence, and modifying terms of release.
178 See infra Table 15.
179 The eighteen claims addressed by the First, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits
were unsuccessful. See RFRA Case Data, supra note 26.
180 See id. The success rates in the remaining circuits were as follows: D.C. Circuit (two
of eighteen claims, or 11.1%); Second Circuit (one of seven claims, or 14.3%); Third Circuit
(three of ten claims, or 30.0%); Fifth Circuit (one of four claims, or 25.0%); Eighth Circuit
(three of seven claims, or 42.8%); and the Eleventh Circuit (one of seven claims, or 14.3%).
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UNSUCCESSFUL NUMBER % UNSUCCESSFUL % OF ALL CLAIMS
Dismissal 31 37.8% 31.6%
Summary judgment 24 29.3% 24.5%
Criminal case 19 23.2% 19.4%
Miscellaneous motions 6 7.3% 6.1%
Trial 2 2.4% 2.0%
Total 82 100.0% 83.7%
Of the eighty-two unsuccessful claims, the vast majority failed as a result of mo-
tions to dismiss or for summary judgment.181 Thirty-one claims (31.6% of appellate
cases) were dismissed, and twenty-four claims (24.5% of appellate cases) were sub-
ject to summary judgment.182 The remaining unsuccessful claims were the result of
criminal proceedings (nineteen claims), miscellaneous motions (six claims), and trial
(two claims).183
Six of the sixteen successful appellate outcomes were classified as such based
upon the denial of an opposing party’s motion for summary judgment.184 Three opin-
ions were classified as successful based upon the outcome of miscellaneous motions.185
181 See supra Table 15.
182 See supra Table 15. Motions to dismiss were granted with the following frequency: D.C.
Circuit (ten claims); Ninth Circuit (five claims); Second and Fourth Circuits (four claims
each); Third Circuit (three claims); Eighth and Eleventh Circuits (two claims each); and Sixth
Circuit (one claim). See RFRA Case Data, supra note 26. Summary judgment was entered
with the following frequency: D.C. and Ninth Circuits (five claims each); Seventh Circuit
(four claims); Second, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits (two claims each); and First, Third, Sixth,
and Tenth Circuits (one claim each). See id.
183 See supra Table 15. Unsuccessful outcomes in criminal cases were distributed among
the following circuits: Ninth Circuit (eight claims); Tenth Circuit (five claims); Eighth Circuit
(two claims); and Third, Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits (one claim each). See RFRA
Case Data, supra note 26. Miscellaneous motions terminated three claims in the Ninth Circuit,
two claims in the Third Circuit, and one claim in the D.C. Circuit. See id. The two instances of
appellate affirmation of results at trial occurred in the U.S. Supreme Court and the Eleventh
Circuit. See id.
184 See Potts v. Holt, 617 F. App’x 148 (3d Cir. 2015) (concerning claim by incarcerated
individual relating to diet); Davila v. Gladden, 777 F.3d 1198 (11th Cir. 2015) (concerning
incarcerated individual’s access to ornaments for the practice of Santería); McAllen Grace
Brethren Church v. Salazar, 764 F.3d 465 (5th Cir. 2014) (possession of feathers derived from
endangered eagles); Daley v. Lappin, 555 F. App’x 161 (3d Cir. 2014) (concerning claim by
incarcerated individual relating to diet); Levitan v. Ashcroft, 281 F.3d 1313 (D.C. Cir. 2002)
(concerning claim by incarcerated individual relating to access to communion wine); Davidson
v. Chestnut, 193 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 1999) (concerning claim by incarcerated individual relating
to kosher diet); see also supra note 109 and accompanying text.
185 See Wheaton Coll. v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2806 (2014); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores,
Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014); Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente União do Vegetal,
546 U.S. 418 (2006); see also supra note 109 and accompanying text.
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Six additional opinions were equally divided between denial of an opposing party’s
motion to dismiss, outcome at trial, or as the result of a criminal proceeding.186 One
opinion resulted in the granting of a claimant’s motion for summary judgment.187
However, it is uncertain whether any of the successful claims from denials of dis-
missal and denials of summary judgment ultimately resulted in favorable outcomes
for the claimants.188 The success rate plunges to eight claims (8.2%) if the determi-
nation of success is based solely upon these outcomes.189
Another dimension by which to analyze outcomes is by their correlation with the
identity of claimants. The outcomes in appellate courts by identity of the claimant are
summarized in Table 16 below.
Table 16: Outcomes in U.S. Appellate Courts by Identity of the Claimant
CLAIMANT UNSUCCESSFUL SUCCESSFUL SUCCESS RATE
Business organizations 0 1 100.0%
Educational institutions 1 1 50.0%
Places of worship 8 3 27.3%
Incarcerated individuals 39 10 20.4%
Private individuals 30 1 3.2%
Non-profit organizations 1 0 0.0%
Religious organizations 3 0 0.0%
Total 82 16 16.3%
186 See Mack v. Warden, 839 F.3d 286 (3d Cir. 2016) (denying motion to dismiss incar-
cerated individual’s discrimination claim); United States v. Ali, 682 F.3d 705 (8th Cir. 2012)
(vacating in part and remanding conviction for criminal contempt of court); Fegans v. Norris,
537 F.3d 897 (8th Cir. 2008) (affirming verdict in favor of an incarcerated individual relating
to diet); United States v. Zimmerman, 514 F.3d 851 (9th Cir. 2007) (denying motion to
dismiss incarcerated individual’s claim regarding provision of blood sample); In re Young,
141 F.3d 854 (8th Cir. 1998) (concerning recovery of bankrupt’s tithes to church as fraudulent
transfers); United States v. Bauer, 84 F.3d 1549 (9th Cir. 1996) (concerning Rastafarian de-
fendants’ conspiracy to manufacture and distribute marijuana and money laundering charges);
see also supra notes 109, 163 and accompanying text.
187 See Potter v. Dist. of Columbia, 558 F.3d 542 (D.C. Cir. 2009). See also supra note
105 and accompanying text.
188 See Mack, 839 F.3d at 286 (denying motion to dismiss); Potts, 617 F. App’x at 148
(denying motion summary judgment); Davila, 777 F.3d at 1198 (reversing grant of summary
judgment for defendant); McAllen Grace, 764 F.3d at 465 (denying motion for summary
judgment); Daley, 555 F. App’x at 161 (denying motion for summary judgment); Zimmerman,
514 F.3d 851 (denying motion to dismiss); Levitan, 281 F.3d at 1313 (denying motion for
summary judgment); Davidson, 193 F.3d at 144 (denying motion for summary judgment);
see also RFRA Case Data, supra note 26.
189 See supra notes 185–87 and accompanying text.
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The success rate of business organizations is misleading as it is based upon a
single opinion.190 Equally misleading is the success rate for educational institutions
which is based on two opinions, one of which resulted in a favorable outcome.191 Of
the remaining claimants, places of worship were successful in three of eleven cases
for a success rate of 27.3%.192 Incarcerated individuals were successful in ten of forty-
nine claims for a success rate of 20.4%.193 Individuals had a success rate of 3.2%
consisting of a single opinion.194 The four claims filed by religious and non-profit
organizations were unsuccessful.195
190 See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2751 (2014) (granting pre-
liminary injunction); see also supra note 109 and accompanying text.
191 See Wheaton Coll. v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2806, 2806 (2014) (granting preliminary injunc-
tion); see also supra note 109 and accompanying text. The unsuccessful opinion involving
an educational institution dismissed a challenge to the Affordable Care Act’s insurance mandate.
See Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Lew, 733 F.3d 72 (4th Cir. 2013).
192 See Gonzales v. O Centro Espírita Beneficente União do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006)
(granting preliminary injunction); McAllen Grace Brethren Church v. Salazar, 764 F.3d 465
(5th Cir. 2014) (denying defendant’s motion for summary judgment); In re Young, 141 F.3d
854 (8th Cir. 1998) (affirming trial verdict); see also supra notes 106, 109 and accompanying
text. Unsuccessful opinions involving places of worship were divided among summary judg-
ment (four claims) and dismissal, miscellaneous motions, criminal proceedings, and at trial
(one claim each). See RFRA Case Data, supra note 26.
193 See Mack v. Warden, 839 F.3d 286 (3d Cir. 2016) (denying motion to dismiss); Potts
v. Holt, 617 F. App’x 148 (3d Cir. 2015) (denying motion for summary judgment); Davila
v. Gladden, 777 F.3d 1198 (11th Cir. 2015) (denying motion for summary judgment); Daley
v. Lappin, 555 F. App’x 161 (3d Cir. 2014) (denying motion for summary judgment); United
States v. Ali, 682 F.3d 705 (8th Cir. 2012) (remanding conviction of criminal contempt of
court); Fegans v. Norris, 537 F.3d 897 (8th Cir. 2008) (affirming trial verdict); United States
v. Zimmerman, 514 F.3d 851 (9th Cir. 2007) (denying motion to dismiss); Levitan v. Ashcroft,
281 F.3d 1313 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (denying motion for summary judgment); Davidson v.
Chestnut, 193 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 1999) (denying motion for summary judgment); United
States v. Bauer, 75 F.3d 1366 (9th Cir. 1996) (reversing conviction); see also supra notes
163, 184, 186 and accompanying text. Unsuccessful opinions involving incarcerated individuals
were divided among criminal proceedings (eighteen claims), dismissal (twelve claims), sum-
mary judgment (eight claims), and miscellaneous motions (one claim). See RFRA Case Data,
supra note 26.
194 See Potter v. Dist. of Columbia, 558 F.3d 542 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (granting claimant’s
motion for summary judgment); see also infra note 105 and accompanying text. Unsuccessful
opinions involving individuals were divided among dismissal (fifteen claims), summary
judgment (ten claims), miscellaneous motions (four claims), and unfavorable outcome at trial
(one claim). See RFRA Case Data, supra note 26.
195 See La Cuna de Aztlán Sacred Sites Prot. Circle Advisory Comm. v. U.S. Dep’t of the
Interior, 603 F. App’x 651 (9th Cir. 2015) (granting summary judgment); Multi-Denominational
Ministry of Cannabis & Rastafari, Inc. v. Holder, 365 F. App’x 817 (9th Cir. 2010) (granting
dismissal); Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156 (D.C. Cir. 2003)
(granting summary judgment); La Voz Radio de la Communidad v. FCC, 223 F.3d 313 (6th
Cir. 2000) (granting dismissal); see also supra notes 106, 109–10, and accompanying text.
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The success rates assume a favorable outcome in those instances where motions
to dismiss or for summary judgment were denied.196 However, it is impossible to de-
termine from the opinions whether this assumption is entirely accurate.197 The suc-
cess rates of two claimants decrease significantly if successful outcomes are limited
to those instances where a claimant was granted summary judgment or injunctive
relief, prevailed at trial, or was successful in challenging a criminal conviction.198
The success rate of places of worship drops to 18.2% if the measure of success is
so limited.199 The success rate for claims by incarcerated individuals drops to 4.1%
utilizing this measure.200
A second comparison is between outcomes and the types of claims. The outcomes
in appellate courts by type of claim are summarized in Table 17 below.
Table 17: Outcomes in U.S. Appellate Courts by Type of Claim
TYPE OF CLAIM UNSUCCESSFUL SUCCESSFUL SUCCESS RATE
Conditions of confinement 22 8 26.7%
Legal processes 11 4 26.7%
Crime/tort defense 19 2 9.5%
Religious expression 21 2 8.7%
Education 1 0 0.0%
Land use 8 0 0.0%
Total 82 16 16.3%
The success rate varies from 26.7% for claims relating to conditions of confine-
ment and legal processes to 0.0% for claims based upon land use and education.201
The eight successful claims relating to conditions of confinement were the result of
five denials of motions for summary judgment, two denials of motions to dismiss, and
one affirmation of a trial verdict.202 However, the success rate is reduced to a single
claim, 3.3% of claims relating to conditions of confinement, if the measure of success
196 See supra note 188.
197 See supra note 188.
198 See supra notes 185–87 and accompanying text.
199 See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
200 See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
201 See supra Table 17. The land-use claims were terminated as a result of summary judg-
ment (three claims), miscellaneous motions and dismissal (two claims each), and affirmation
of a trial verdict (one claim). See RFRA Case Data, supra note 26; see also supra note 110
and accompanying text. The education claim was terminated by summary judgment. See
RFRA Case Data, supra note 26; see also supra note 111 and accompanying text.
202 See supra notes 184, 186, 193 and accompanying text. The unsuccessful claims relating
to conditions of confinement were terminated on the basis of dismissal (twelve claims), sum-
mary judgment (eight claims), and miscellaneous motions and criminal proceedings (one claim
each). See RFRA Case Data, supra note 26.
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is limited to a result with a degree of finality.203 The four successful legal processes
claims were the result of three motions granting preliminary injunctions and one
affirmation of a trial verdict.204 This success rate is of considerable importance given
that three opinions are from the U.S. Supreme Court.205 As expected, the crime and
tort defense was rarely successful.206
Claims relating to religious expression prevailed in only two of twenty-three
cases for a success rate of 8.7%.207 The low success rate for what might be the most
traditional use of RFRA may be indicative of the ineffectiveness of the statute and its
possible misuse through the assertion of groundless claims.208 The success rate of
religious expression claims is reduced to a single claim if the measurement of favor-
able outcomes is limited to a final result.209
2. Outcomes in U.S. District Courts
The lack of success in appellate courts was repeated in district courts. Thirty-six
of the two hundred and five cases (17.6%) in district courts were successful.210 District
courts in two circuits did not have a successful claim.211 Success rates varied among
courts in the remaining circuits from 53.3% out of fifteen claims in the Seventh Circuit
to 4.2% out of twenty-four claims in the Fourth Circuit.212 Success rates were higher
in district courts than in appellate courts in eight circuits, lower in three circuits, and
identical in one circuit.213 The combined appellate and district court success rates
203 See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
204 See supra notes 109, 190–92 and accompanying text. The unsuccessful claims relating
to legal processes were terminated on the basis of dismissal (seven claims), summary judgment
(three claims), and a miscellaneous motion (one claim). See RFRA Case Data, supra note 26.
205 See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
206 See supra notes 186, 193 and accompanying text. The unsuccessful claims relating to
the crime and tort defense were terminated on the basis of criminal proceedings (eighteen
claims) and a miscellaneous motion (one claim). See RFRA Case Data, supra note 26.
207 See supra notes 192, 194 and accompanying text. The unsuccessful claims relating to
religious expression were subject to dismissal (ten claims), summary judgment (nine claims),
and a miscellaneous motion and affirmation of a trial verdict (one claim each). See RFRA
Case Data, supra note 26.
208 See RFRA Case Data, supra note 26.
209 See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
210 See infra Table 18.
211 The sixteen claims in district courts in the First and Eighth Circuits were unsuccessful.
See RFRA Case Data, supra note 26.
212 See RFRA Case Data, supra note 26. The success rates in the remaining circuits were
as follows: D.C. Circuit (three of nineteen claims, or 15.8%); Second Circuit (three of seventeen
claims, or 17.6%); Third Circuit (three of twenty-three claims, or 13.0%); Fifth Circuit (two of
twenty-two claims, or 9.1%); Sixth Circuit (two of thirteen claims, or 15.4%); Ninth Circuit
(five of thirty-one claims, or 16.1%); Tenth Circuit (eight of twenty claims, or 40.0%); and
Eleventh Circuit (one of five claims, or 20.0%).
213 Success rates were higher in district courts in the D.C., Second, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh,
Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits. See supra notes 179–80 and accompanying text. Success
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by circuit varied from 40.0% in the Seventh Circuit to 3.6% in the Fourth Circuit.214
The results in district courts by type of outcome are summarized in Table 18 below.
Table 18: Outcomes in U.S. District Courts by Type
SUCCESSFUL NUMBER % SUCCESSFUL % OF ALL CLAIMS
Denial of dismissal 16 44.4% 7.8%
Denial of summary judgment 6 16.7% 2.9%
Trial 6 16.7% 2.9%
Grant of summary judgment 4 11.1% 2.0%
Criminal case 4 11.1% 2.0%
Miscellaneous motions 0 0.0% 0.0%
Total 36 100.0% 17.6%
UNSUCCESSFUL NUMBER % UNSUCCESSFUL % OF ALL CLAIMS
Dismissal 70 41.4% 34.1%
Summary judgment 51 30.2% 24.9%
Criminal case 28 16.5% 13.6%
Miscellaneous motions 16 9.5% 7.8%
Trial 4 2.4% 2.0%
Total 169 100.0% 82.4%
One hundred and twenty-one unsuccessful district court claims failed as a result
of motions to dismiss or for summary judgment.215 Seventy claims (34.1%) were
dismissed, and fifty-one claims (24.9%) were subject to summary judgment.216 An
rates were lower in district courts in the Third, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits. See id. The success
rate was identical in the First Circuit, which was the only circuit without a single successful
claim at the appellate or district court levels. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
214 See supra notes 179–80, 211–13 and accompanying text. The combined appellate and
district court success rates by circuit in the remaining circuits were D.C. Circuit (five of thirty-
seven claims, or 13.5%); Second Circuit (four of twenty-four claims, or 16.7%); Third Circuit
(six of thirty-three claims, or 18.2%); Fifth Circuit (three of twenty-six claims, or 11.5%);
Sixth Circuit (two of fifteen claims, or 13.3%); Eighth Circuit (three of seventeen claims, or
17.6%); Ninth Circuit (seven of fifty-four claims, or 13.0%); and the Eleventh Circuit (two
of twelve claims, or 16.7%); see also RFRA Case Data, supra note 26.
215 See supra Table 18.
216 See supra Table 18. Motions to dismiss were granted by district courts with the following
frequency: Fourth Circuit (fourteen claims); D.C., Second, Ninth and Tenth Circuits (eight
claims each); Third Circuit (seven claims); Fifth Circuit (six claims); Eighth Circuit (four
claims); Sixth Circuit (three claims); First Circuit (two claims); and Seventh and Eleventh Cir-
cuits (one claim each). Summary judgment was entered by district courts with the following
frequency: Fifth Circuit (ten claims); Third Circuit (eight claims); Fourth Circuit (seven claims);
Ninth Circuit (six claims); D.C. and Seventh Circuits (four claims each); Second and Sixth
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additional twenty-eight unsuccessful claims (13.6%) involved criminal proceedings.217
Sixteen claims failed as a result of miscellaneous motions.218 The remaining four
unsuccessful claims were unfavorable results at trial.219
Sixteen of the thirty-six successful district court outcomes were classified as such
based upon the denial of an opposing party’s motion to dismiss.220 Twelve success-
ful outcomes were split equally between denial of an opposing party’s motion for
Circuits (three claims each); Eighth and Tenth Circuits (two claims each); and First and
Eleventh Circuits (one claim each). See RFRA Case Data, supra note 26.
217 See supra Table 18. Unsuccessful outcomes in criminal cases were distributed among
district courts in the following circuits: Ninth Circuit (five claims); Third Circuit (four claims);
Second, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits (three claims each); First and Seventh Circuits (two
claims each); and Fourth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits (one claim each). See RFRA Case
Data, supra note 26.
218 See supra Table 18. Adverse rulings on miscellaneous motions were distributed among
district courts in the following circuits: Ninth Circuit (six claims); D.C. Circuit (three claims);
Sixth Circuit (two claims); First, Third, Fourth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits (one claim each).
See RFRA Case Data, supra note 26.
219 See supra Table 18. The four adverse results at trial were in district courts in the D.C.,
Fifth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits. See RFRA Case Data, supra note 26.
220 See Ajaj v. United States, No. 15-cv-00992-RBJ-KLM, 2016 WL 6212518 (D. Colo.
Oct. 25, 2016) (concerning access to worship services, medication, and dietary policy for incar-
cerated individual); Cherokee Nation W. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, No. 14-CV-612-JED-
TLW, 2016 WL 4548441 (N.D. Okla. Aug. 31, 2016) (concerning private organization’s access
to federal land for religious ceremony); Rosales v. Watts, No. 2:15-cv-94, 2016 WL 3432463
(S.D. Ga. June 17, 2016) (concerning access to worship services by incarcerated individual);
Hale v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, No. 14-cv-00245-MSK-MJW, 2015 WL 5719649 (D. Colo.
Sept. 30, 2015) (concerning dietary policy and ban on receipt of mail for incarcerated indi-
vidual); Womack v. Cross, No. 15-cv-00543-MJR, 2015 WL 3567537 (S.D. Ill. June 8,
2015) (concerning use of sweat lodge by incarcerated individual); Njos v. Carney, No. 3:CV-
12-1375, 2015 WL 328249 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 26, 2015) (concerning dietary policy for incar-
cerated individual); Tagore v. United States, No. H-09-0027, 2014 WL 2880008 (S.D. Tex.
June 24, 2014) (concerning the right to carry a ceremonial sword in the workplace); Rezaq v.
United States, No. 13-cv-00990-MJR, 2013 WL 5809351 (S.D. Ill. Oct. 29, 2013) (con-
cerning dietary policy for incarcerated individual); Penn v. N.Y. Methodist Hosp., No. 11-cv-
9137 (NSR), 2013 WL 5477600 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2013) (concerning alleged employment
discrimination on the basis of religion); Skurdal v. Fed. Det. Ctr., No. C12-706 RSM, 2013 WL
3897772 (W.D. Wash. July 29, 2013) (concerning dietary policy for incarcerated individual);
Chesser v. Rivas, No. 13-cv-00456-JPG, 2013 WL 2634798 (S.D. Ill. June 12, 2013) (concern-
ing dietary policy for incarcerated individual); Cooke v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 926 F. Supp.
2d 720 (E.D.N.C. 2013) (concerning access to worship services for incarcerated individual);
Yassin v. Corrs. Corp. of Am., No. 11cv0421 LAB (JMA), 2011 WL 4501403 (S.D. Cal.
Sept. 27, 2011) (concerning dietary policy for incarcerated individual); Kole v. FCI Danbury,
No. 09-cv-1865(JCH), 2010 WL 2679981 (D. Conn. June 28, 2010) (concerning dietary
policy for incarcerated individual); Saunders v. Wilner, No. 09-cv-00114-REB-KMT, 2010
WL 582373 (D. Colo. Feb. 18, 2010) (concerning access to worship services for incarcerated
individual); Ford v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, No. 08-cv-00882-LTB-BNB, 2009 WL 3011112
(D. Colo. Sept. 16, 2009) (concerning dietary policy for incarcerated individual).
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summary judgment and outcomes at trial.221 The remaining eight claims were divided
equally between the granting of a claimant’s motion for summary judgment and posi-
tive outcomes in criminal cases.222
As in the case of claims in appellate courts, these success rates may be inflated,
as it is uncertain whether any of the claims other than as a result of the granting of a
motion for summary judgment, the entry of a verdict at trial, or success in a criminal
case, ultimately resulted in favorable outcomes for the claimants.223 The success rate
drops to fourteen claims (6.8%) if the determination of success is based solely upon
these three outcomes.224
221 See Roman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, No. 3:15-CV-2247, 2016 WL 8673129 (M.D.
Pa. Sept. 30, 2016) (denying motion for summary judgment regarding access to worship ser-
vices for incarcerated individuals); Pauley v. Samuels, No. 15-158 Erie, 2016 WL 5468065
(W.D. Pa. Sept. 29, 2016) (denying motion for summary judgment regarding access to wor-
ship services for incarcerated individuals); Crowder v. Lariva, No. 2:14-cv-00202-JMS-MJD,
2016 WL 4733539 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 12, 2016) (denying motion for summary judgment regarding
dietary policy for incarcerated individual); Atkinson v. Mackinnon, No. 14-cv-736-bbc, 2016
WL 2901753 (W.D. Wis. May 18, 2016) (denying motion for summary judgment regarding
incarcerated individual’s discrimination claim); Rezaq v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, No. 13-cv-
00990-MJR-SCW, 2016 WL 97763 (S.D. Ill. Jan. 8, 2016) (denying summary judgment re-
garding access to worship services for incarcerated individual); United States v. Girod, 159
F. Supp. 3d 773 (E.D. Ky. 2015) (granting injunction); Lindh v. Dir., No. 2:14-cv-151-JMS-
WGH, 2015 WL 4086373 (S.D. Ind. July 6, 2015) (entering judgment in favor of incarcerated
individual regarding access to worship services); Church of the Holy Light of the Queen v.
Holder, No. 1:08-cv-3095-PA, 2012 WL 5985122 (D. Or. Nov. 29, 2012) (granting injunction);
Forde v. Baird, 720 F. Supp. 2d 170 (D. Conn. 2010) (entering judgment in favor of incar-
cerated individual); Comanche Nation v. United States, No. CIV-08-849-D, 2008 WL 4426621
(W.D. Okla. Sept. 23, 2008) (granting injunction); Gartrell v. Ashcroft, 191 F. Supp. 2d 23
(D.D.C. 2002) (entering judgment in favor of incarcerated individual regarding grooming
policy); In re Hodge, 220 B.R. 386 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1998) (denying trustee’s motion for
summary judgment); see also supra notes 122, 124, 127, 165 and accompanying text.
222 See Lindh v. Warden, No. 2:14-cv-00142-JMS-DKL, 2016 WL 4528478 (S.D. Ind.
Aug. 30, 2016) (granting summary judgment on challenge to strip search policy); EEOC v. R.G.
& G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 3d 837 (E.D. Mich. 2016) (granting sum-
mary judgment); Singh v. McHugh, 185 F. Supp. 3d 201 (D.D.C. 2016) (granting summary
judgment); United States v. Hardman, 622 F. Supp. 2d 1129 (D. Utah 2009) (vacating con-
viction); United States v. Ramon, 86 F. Supp. 2d 665 (W.D. Tex. 2000) (granting motion to
suppress marijuana evidence); United States v. Valrey, No. CR96-549Z, 2000 WL 692647
(W.D. Wash. Feb. 22, 2000) (modifying terms of release); Rigdon v. Perry, 962 F. Supp. 2d
150 (D.D.C. 1997) (granting summary judgment); United States v. Gonzales, 957 F. Supp.
1225 (D.N.M. 1997) (dismissing criminal prosecution for possession of eagle feathers); see
also supra notes 118, 121, 163, 165, 169 and accompanying text.
223 When a party prevails on a summary judgment motion or receives a favorable outcome
at trial, the trial proceedings terminate as the court has entered a final judgment. However,
when a party prevails on a motion to dismiss or other miscellaneous motion, the proceedings
do not necessarily end. Courts, for example, may dismiss a claim, but allow the claimant to
amend its complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2).
224 See supra notes 220–22 and accompanying text.
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The correlation between outcomes and the identity of claimants in district courts
was largely similar to appellate cases.225 The outcomes in district courts by identity
of the claimants are summarized in Table 19 below.
Table 19: Outcomes in U.S. District Courts by Identity of the Claimant
CLAIMANT UNSUCCESSFUL SUCCESSFUL SUCCESS RATE
Business organizations 1 1 50.0%
Places of worship 6 2 25.0%
Incarcerated individuals 100 27 21.2%
Private individuals 48 6 11.1%
Educational institutions 3 0 0.0%
Religious organizations 5 0 0.0%
Non-profit organizations 6 0 0.0%
Total 169 36 17.6%
The success rate of business organizations in district courts is statistically in-
significant as it is based upon a single opinion which was ultimately reversed on
appeal.226 Of the remaining district court claimants, places of worship, incarcerated
individuals, and religious and non-profit organizations had success rates that were
identical or very similar to such rates in appellate court opinions.227
The success rates of educational institutions and individuals varied significantly
between appellate and district courts.228 Educational institutions were unsuccessful
in all three district court opinions as compared to a 50.0% success rate in appellate
courts, although this difference is less significant than it appears given that the total
sample consists of only five claims.229 The success rates for private individuals in dis-
trict courts was 11.1%, which constitutes six out of fifty-four claims.230
Reasons for the difference between success rates for individuals in appellate and
district courts are unclear. One possible explanation may be the underlying weakness
225 Compare infra Table 19 (district court claims) with supra Table 16 (appellate court
claims).
226 See R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 3d 837, rev’d, 884 F.3d
560 (6th Cir. 2018).
227 See supra notes 193, 195, 220–22 and accompanying text.
228 Compare supra Table 19 (district court claims) with supra Table 16 (appellate court
claims).
229 See supra notes 109, 118, 125, 128 and accompanying text.
230 See supra Table 19; Cherokee Nation W. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, No. 14-CV-
612-JED-TLW, 2016 WL 4548441 (N.D. Okla. Aug. 31, 2016); Singh v. McHugh, 185 F.
Supp. 3d 201 (D.D.C. 2016); Tagore v. United States, No. H-09-0027, 2014 WL 2880008
(S.D. Tex. June 24, 2014); Comanche Nation v. United States, No. CIV-08-849-D, 2008 WL
4426621 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 23, 2008); In re Hodge, 220 B.R. 386 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1998);
Rigdon v. Perry, 962 F. Supp. 2d 150 (D.D.C. 1997); see also supra notes 121, 124, 127, 154,
220–24 and accompanying text.
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of individual claims considered by appellate courts. Several claims raised issues upon
which individuals were unlikely to prevail, such as challenges to federal policies
concerning taxation, immigration, narcotics control, and administrative and military
procedures.231 It is clear that the differing success rates are not attributable to a less-
rigorous application of RFRA by district courts, since every district court opinion
reviewed by an appellate court resulted in an affirmation.232 These explanations may
render the difference in success rates less significant.
The success rates of places of worship, incarcerated individuals, and other indi-
viduals, vary depending upon how favorable outcomes are measured. The success rate
for places of worship is halved to a single claim if success is defined as the granting
of a motion for summary judgment, the entry of a verdict at trial, or success in a crim-
inal case.233 The success rate for incarcerated individuals drops to 7.1%, representing
nine claims utilizing this measure.234 There are three successful claims by private
individuals utilizing this measure for an overall success rate of 5.5%.235
The correlation between outcomes and the type of claim also differs in district
courts. The outcomes in district courts by type of claims are summarized in Table 20
below.
Table 20: Outcomes in U.S. District Courts by Type of Claim
TYPE OF CLAIM UNSUCCESSFUL SUCCESSFUL SUCCESS RATE
Land use 5 2 28.6%
Conditions of confinement 82 24 22.6%
Religious expression 27 5 15.6%
Crime/tort defense 26 4 13.3%
Legal processes 27 1 3.6%
Education 2 0 0.0%
Total 169 36 17.6%
231 See supra notes 105, 108, 110, 154, 169–70 and accompanying text.
232 See, e.g., Leonard v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 598 F. App’x 9 (D.C. Cir. 2015); Ruiz-Diaz
v. United States, 703 F.3d 483 (9th Cir. 2012); Perkel v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 365 F. App’x
755 (9th Cir. 2010) (denying petitions for review); Muhammad v. Ahern, 350 F. App’x 529
(2d Cir. 2009); Snoqualmie Indian Tribe v. FERC, 545 F.3d 1207 (9th Cir. 2008) (denying
petition for review); Olsen v. Mukasey, 541 F.3d 827 (8th Cir. 2008); Navajo Nation v. U.S.
Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2008); Larsen v. U.S. Navy, 525 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2008)
(remanding with instructions to dismiss); Fernandez v. Mukasey, 520 F.3d 965 (9th Cir. 2008)
(denying petition for review); Tabbaa v. Chertoff, 509 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2007); Kiczenski v.
Gonzales, 237 F. App’x 149 (9th Cir. 2007); Jenkins v. Comm’r, 483 F.3d 90 (2d Cir. 2007);
Veitch v. England, 471 F.3d 124 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Browne v. United States, 176 F.3d 25 (2d
Cir. 1999); Adams v. Comm’r, 170 F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 1999); Droz v. Comm’r, 48 F.3d 1120
(9th Cir. 1995).
233 See supra note 221 and accompanying text; RFRA Case Data, supra note 26.
234 See supra notes 221–22 and accompanying text; RFRA Case Data, supra note 26.
235 See supra notes 220–22 and accompanying text; RFRA Case Data, supra note 26.
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Land-use claims were the second-smallest claim but had the highest success rate
at 28.6%, although this rate was the result of only two positive outcomes.236 Positive
outcomes are reduced to a single case if a final judgment in favor of the claimant is
utilized as the measure of success.237 Religious expression claims were less frequent
as a percentage of claims in district courts, but more successful with positive out-
comes in five of thirty-two cases.238 Positive outcomes are reduced to three claims,
representing a success rate of 9.4%, if a final judgment in favor of the claimant is uti-
lized as the measure of success.239 This rate is only slightly higher than the success rate
for such claims in appellate courts.240 The crime and tort defense was also small as a
percentage of district court claims, but was more successful than in appellate courts.241
Success rates of two types of claims were lower in district courts.242 Claims based
upon conditions of confinement were more common in district courts, but slightly
less successful.243 Successful outcomes based upon conditions of confinement are re-
duced to 5.7% representing six claims, if success is measured by final outcomes.244
This rate is higher than its appellate counterpart.245 The most significant difference
concerned legal processes claims. Legal processes claims prevailed in district courts
in a single opinion for an overall success rate of 3.6%.246 This rate would be 0.0% if
utilizing a more rigorous measure of success.247 There are several possible reasons for
this difference. The success rate for legal processes claims in appellate courts is in-
flated due to three successful claims at the U.S. Supreme Court.248 There was a single
236 See supra Table 20. The five unsuccessful land-use claims were subject to dismissal
(three claims) and summary judgment and a miscellaneous motion (one claim each). See RFRA
Case Data, supra note 26; see also supra notes 127, 220–21, 230 and accompanying text.
237 See supra note 221 and accompanying text; RFRA Case Data, supra note 26.
238 See supra Table 20. The twenty-seven unsuccessful religious expression claims were
subject to entry of summary judgment (ten claims), dismissal (eight claims), miscellaneous
motion (seven claims), and negative outcomes at trial or in a criminal case (one claim each).
See RFRA Case Data, supra note 26; see also supra notes 119–22, 220–22, 230–31 and
accompanying text.
239 See supra notes 219–22, 230 and accompanying text; RFRA Case Data, supra note 26.
240 See supra note 209 and accompanying text.
241 See supra Table 20; see also supra notes 163, 222, 226 and accompanying text. The
success rate for the crime and tort defense in district courts is unaffected by changes in the
measures of success, as each claim resulted in a final judgment in favor of the claimant. See
RFRA Case Data, supra note 26.
242 Compare supra Table 20 (regarding outcomes in district courts) with supra Table 17
(regarding outcomes in appellate courts).
243 See supra Table 20; see also supra notes 202–03, 220–21 and accompanying text; RFRA
Case Data, supra note 26.
244 See supra note 221 and accompanying text; RFRA Case Data, supra note 26.
245 See supra notes 193, 203 and accompanying text.
246 See supra Table 20; see also supra note 221 and accompanying text; RFRA Case Data,
supra note 26.
247 See supra note 220 and accompanying text.
248 See supra notes 109, 190–92, 205 and accompanying text.
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successful legal processes claim in appellate courts outside of the U.S. Supreme
Court.249 Furthermore, the subject matter of legal processes claims raised issues upon
which claimants were unlikely to prevail.250 A reluctance to grant relief is reflected
in the predominance of orders dismissing claims or granting motions for summary
judgment in appellate and district courts.251 This reluctance is also reflected in the
affirmation of results by appellate courts.252 The differences in success rates are less
pronounced given these factors.
3. Composite Outcomes
Fifty-two claims in the sample (17.2%) resulted in a favorable outcome for claim-
ants.253 Composite outcomes in federal courts by type of outcome are summarized
in Table 21 below.
Table 21: Outcomes in All Federal Courts by Type
SUCCESSFUL NUMBER % SUCCESSFUL % OF ALL CLAIMS
Denial of motion to dismiss 18 34.6% 5.9%
Denial of summary judgment 12 23.1% 4.0%
Trial 8 15.4% 2.6%
Criminal case 6 11.5% 2.0%
Grant of summary judgment 5 9.6% 1.7%
Miscellaneous motions 3 5.8% 1.0%
Total 52 100.0% 17.2%
UNSUCCESSFUL NUMBER % UNSUCCESSFUL % OF ALL CLAIMS
Dismissal 101 40.2% 33.3%
Summary judgment 75 29.9% 24.7%
Criminal case 47 18.7% 15.5%
Miscellaneous motions 22 8.8% 7.3%
Trial 6 2.4% 2.0%
Total 251 100.0% 82.8%
249 See supra notes 109, 192, 204 and accompanying text.
250 See supra note 231 and accompanying text.
251 Unsuccessful legal processes claims in appellate courts were subject to dismissal in seven
cases (63.6% of claims), and entry of summary judgment in three cases (27.3% of claims).
Unsuccessful legal processes claims in district courts were subject to dismissal in fourteen cases
(51.8% of claims), and entry of summary judgment in eight cases (25.9% of claims). See RFRA
Case Data, supra note 26.
252 See supra notes 231–32 and accompanying text.
253 See infra Table 21; see also RFRA Case Data, supra note 26.
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The composite success rate varied from the rates in appellate and district courts.254
Denials of motions to dismiss were the most common successful outcome for claimant
in district courts, but were infrequent in appellate courts, resulting in a composite per-
centage of 34.6% of successful outcomes.255 This pattern repeated with respect to
outcomes based upon the entry of summary judgment and judgment as a result of a
trial.256 The pattern reversed with respect to denials of summary judgment and out-
comes in criminal cases, all of which were larger percentages of successful outcomes
for claimants in appellate courts.257 The composite claimant success rate for miscel-
laneous motions was entirely dependent upon outcomes in appellate courts.258
The composite success rate is considerably lower if it is calculated utilizing only
final positive outcomes. Twenty-two claims qualify as successful if this method of
classification is utilized resulting in a composite success rate for claimants of 7.3%.259
This method of classification also changes the overall distribution of successful out-
comes. Positive outcomes at trial constitute 36.4% of all successful outcomes for claim-
ants followed by outcomes in criminal cases at 27.3%.260 Cases in which a claimant’s
motion for summary judgment is granted would be 22.7% of all successful outcomes
for claimants with the remaining 13.6% attributable to miscellaneous motions.261
The composite of unsuccessful outcomes for claimants mirrors those in appel-
late and district courts. Dismissals were the most common outcome in appellate and
district courts and in the composite, constituting 40.2% of unsuccessful outcomes
and one-third of all outcomes.262 The same conclusion holds true for termination of
claims through the entry of summary judgment and miscellaneous motions.263 The
pattern is slightly different with respect to outcomes in criminal cases, which were
a larger percentage of unsuccessful outcomes in appellate courts than in district
courts.264 Unsuccessful trial outcomes for claimants as a percentage of unsuccessful
and total claims were identical in appellate and district courts, and thus were iden-
tical to the composite.265
254 Compare supra Table 21 (composite outcomes) with supra Tables 17 & 20.
255 See supra notes 186, 220 and accompanying text; see also supra Tables 15, 18 & 21.
256 See supra notes 186–87, 221–22 and accompanying text; see also supra Tables 15,
18 & 21.
257 See supra notes 184, 186, 221–22 and accompanying text; see also supra Tables 15,
18 & 21.
258 See supra note 185 and accompanying text; see also supra Table 15.
259 See supra notes 185–87, 221–22 and accompanying text.
260 See supra Table 21.
261 See supra Table 21.
262 See supra notes 182, 216 and accompanying text; see also supra Tables 15, 18 & 21.
263 See supra notes 182–83, 216, 218 and accompanying text; see also supra Tables 15,
18 & 21.
264 See supra Table 21; supra notes 183, 217 and accompanying text; see also supra
Tables 15 & 18.
265 See supra notes 183, 219 and accompanying text; see also supra Tables 15, 18 & 21.
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One common feature is the preference for resolution of claims through motion
practice.266 Motions resolved thirty-eight of the successful claims and one hundred
and ninety-eight of the unsuccessful claims that did not involve a trial or criminal
proceeding.267 Two hundred and thirty-six claims (77.9%) were resolved through
motion practice.268
The differing outcomes in appellate and district courts balance one another in the
composite correlation of outcomes by identity of the claimant. Composite outcomes
in federal courts by identity of the claimant are summarized in Table 22.
Table 22: Outcomes in All Federal Courts by Identity of the Claimant
CLAIMANT UNSUCCESSFUL SUCCESSFUL SUCCESS RATE
Business organizations 1 2 66.6%
Places of worship 14 5 26.3%
Incarcerated individuals 139 37 21.0%
Educational institutions 4 1 20.0%
Private individuals 78 7 9.0%
Non-profit organizations 7 0 0.0%
Religious organizations 8 0 0.0%
Total 251 52 17.2%
The 100.0% success rate for claims asserted by business organizations in appellate
courts was offset by the 50.0% success rate for such claimants in district courts.269
The same holds true with respect to the 50.0% success rate for educational institutions
in appellate courts which was offset by their absence of success in district courts.270
Places of worship were also slightly more successful in appellate courts than in district
courts, resulting in a composite success rate of 26.3%.271 Incarcerated individuals were
slightly more successful in district courts, which resulted in a composite success rate
of 21.0%.272 Private individuals were substantially more successful in district courts,
but this success was tempered by their almost complete absence of success in appel-
late courts.273 As a result, the composite success rate for private individuals was a
266 See supra Tables 15, 18 & 21.
267 See supra notes 184–87, 220–22 and accompanying text; see also supra Tables 15,
18 & 21.
268 See supra notes 182–83, 216, 218 and accompanying text; see also supra Tables 15,
18 & 21.
269 See supra notes 190, 226 and accompanying text; see also supra Tables 16, 19 & 22.
270 See supra notes 191, 226 and accompanying text; see also supra Tables 16, 19 & 22.
271 See supra notes 192, 227 and accompanying text; see also supra Tables 16, 19 & 22.
272 See supra notes 193, 227 and accompanying text; see also supra Tables 16, 19 & 22.
273 See supra notes 194, 230–31 and accompanying text; see also supra Tables 16 & 19.
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meager 9.0%.274 Non-profit and religious organizations failed in all fifteen of their
asserted claims.275
The success rates of some claimants is reduced if positive outcomes are equated
with finality of result.276 The most significant decline is with respect to incarcerated
individuals. The composite success rate for such claimants dropped from 21.0% to 6.8%
utilizing this more stringent calculus.277 The composite rate for private individuals is
reduced by almost half, from 9.0% to 4.7%, applying this method of measurement.278
The composite rate for places of worship also declines from 26.3% to 15.8%.279 The
success rates of business organizations and educational institutions are unaffected.280
The dominance of successful claims by incarcerated individuals was an unex-
pected finding. Such individuals accounted for 71.1% of combined successful claims.281
Successful claims by other parties lagged far behind. Private individuals accounted
for 13.5% of successful claims, followed by places of worship at 9.6%.282 Equally
unexpected was the complete absence of successful claims by religious and non-
profit organizations.283
The composite success rates by claimants lend support to two conclusions
regarding RFRA’s impact. First, the dominance of claims by incarcerated individ-
uals and the low success rates for places of worship, private individuals, and reli-
gious and non-profit organizations, supports the conclusion that RFRA, as applied,
has been inconsistent with congressional intent. This conclusion assumes RFRA’s
primary intent was to protect the religious liberty of individuals in wake of the holding
in Smith.284 This conclusion is not to denigrate the religious rights of incarcerated
individuals, but rather to note that this group was not the most likely intended bene-
ficiary of RFRA. The second conclusion impacts arguments on both sides of the
RFRA controversy. The meager success rates for most claimants undermines argu-
ments that religion was and remains under attack, and that RFRA provides an effec-
tive means by which to thwart this attack.285 The success rates call into question the
past and present necessity of the legislation.286 However, feared harms such as dis-
crimination and interference with the rule of law have not occurred.287 The minute
274 See supra Table 22.
275 See supra notes 195, 227 and accompanying text; see also supra Tables 16 & 19.
276 See supra notes 196, 220–21, 233 and accompanying text.
277 See supra notes 200, 220–22, 234 and accompanying text.
278 See supra notes 187, 194, 221–22, 235 and accompanying text.
279 See supra notes 192, 227 and accompanying text.
280 See supra notes 190–91, 226 and accompanying text.
281 See supra Table 22.
282 See supra notes 192, 194, 227, 230–31 and accompanying text; see also supra Tables
16, 19 & 22.
283 See supra notes 195, 227 and accompanying text; see also supra Tables 16, 19 & 22.
284 See supra notes 7–8 and accompanying text.
285 See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
286 See supra notes 11–13 and accompanying text.
287 See supra notes 21–24 and accompanying text.
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number of successful claims by individuals and groups other than incarcerated indi-
viduals hardly represents such a threat. However, RFRA’s ineffectiveness may en-
courage supporters to seek more robust legislative solutions. Any such solution may
pose the risks asserted by RFRA opponents.288
Appellate and district court outcomes also balance one another in the composite
correlation of outcomes by type of claim. Composite outcomes in federal courts by
type of claim are summarized in Table 23.
Table 23: Outcomes in All Federal Courts by Type of Claim
TYPE OF CLAIM UNSUCCESSFUL SUCCESSFUL
SUCCESS
RATE
Conditions of confinement 104 32 23.5%
Land use 13 2 13.3%
Religious expression 48 7 12.7%
Crime/tort defense 45 6 11.8%
Legal processes 38 5 11.6%
Education 3 0 0.0%
Total 251 52 17.2%
The success rates in appellate courts for conditions of confinement and legal pro-
cesses (26.7% each) were offset by much lower success rates for similar claims in dis-
trict courts, resulting in composite success rates of 23.5% and 11.6% respectively.289
The composite rate for claims relating to conditions of confinement declines to 5.1%
(seven of one hundred and thirty-six claims) if successful outcomes are measured by
finality.290 The success rate of legal processes claims declines to 9.3% (four of forty-
three claims) if the same limitation is applied.291
The higher success rates for land-use and religious expression claims and the
crime and tort defense in district courts are offset by lower rates in appellate courts.292
Although land use was the most successful claim in district courts, there was an ab-
sence of successful outcomes in appellate courts, resulting in a composite success rate
of 13.3%.293 This composite rate is halved if success is measured by final outcomes.294
Religious expression claims had the third-highest composite rate of success (12.7%),
288 See supra notes 17–24 and accompanying text.
289 See supra notes 202–03, 204–05, 243, 246–52 and accompanying text; see also supra
Tables 17, 20 & 23.
290 See supra notes 203, 244 and accompanying text.
291 See supra notes 204–05, 246–52 and accompanying text.
292 See supra notes 262, 268–69 and accompanying text; see also supra Tables 17, 20 & 23.
293 See supra notes 201, 236 and accompanying text; see also supra Tables 17, 20 & 23.
294 See supra note 237 and accompanying text.
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reflecting a higher success rate at the district court level.295 The composite rate de-
clines to 7.3% if successful outcomes are measured exclusively by finality.296 The
same result holds true for the crime and tort defense, which had a success rate of
13.3% in district courts but a composite rate of 11.8%, given only two successful out-
comes in appellate courts.297 Legal processes claims were slightly less successful,
with a success rate of 11.6%.298 The success rate of such claims was fully expected
for reasons previously discussed.299
Although it was expected that conditions of confinement would have the highest
success rate given the sheer number of claims, their dominance, 61.5% of successful
outcomes, was not anticipated.300 This dominance is reflected in the data in which con-
ditions of confinement constituted half of all successful appellate outcomes and two-
thirds of all corresponding district court outcomes.301 This dominance may support the
conclusion that, as applied, RFRA has been inconsistent with congressional intent.
The success rates for most types of claims weaken the contention that religion is
under attack while supporting doubts about its necessity.302 This conclusion is re-
inforced by the relatively low success rate for claims other than conditions of con-
finement and especially religious expression and legal processes.303 The deployment
of RFRA in criminal and tort proceedings, although largely unsuccessful, amplifies
arguments relating to its potential misuse.304 However, the weak showing of such
claims, when combined by the lack of success of legal processes claims, rebuts these
contentions.305 These conclusions are reached with the caveat that future legislative
strengthening of RFRA to address perceived shortcomings, or radical judicial expan-
sion of its reach, is not without risk.
The correlations between positive outcomes and offensive and defensive uses
also reflect the relative infrequency of successful RFRA claims. Successful offensive
utilizations of RFRA constituted 78.8% of all successful outcomes for claimants.306
However, offensive utilizations were largely unsuccessful for claimants, as reflected
295 See supra notes 207, 238 and accompanying text; see also supra Tables 17, 20 & 23.
296 See supra notes 208, 239 and accompanying text.
297 See supra notes 206, 241 and accompanying text; see also supra Tables 17, 20 & 23.
The composite rate is unaffected by restricting the definition of successful outcomes, as the
six prevailing claims represented final outcomes. See supra notes 206, 241 and accompany-
ing text.
298 See supra notes 201, 204–05, 246 and accompanying text; see also supra Tables 17,
20 & 23.
299 See supra notes 231–32, 246–52 and accompanying text.
300 See supra Table 23.
301 See supra notes 201–02, 243 and accompanying text; see also supra Tables 17 & 20.
302 See Peters, supra note 11; see also supra notes 286–87 and accompanying text.
303 See supra notes 286–87 and accompanying text.
304 See supra notes 23–24 and accompanying text.
305 See supra notes 22–24, 296–97 and accompanying text.
306 See supra Tables 13 & 14; infra Table 24.
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in the composite success rates of 18.1% of all offensive utilizations and 13.5% of all
claims.307 Successful defensive utilizations were unsurprisingly rare. Successful de-
fensive utilizations were 21.2% of all successful outcomes, but were only 14.3% of
all defensive utilizations and 3.6% of all claims.308 Outcomes by offensive and de-
fensive utilization are summarized in Table 24 below.
Table 24: Outcomes in All Federal Courts by Type of Utilization
UTILIZATION OUTCOME NUMBER OF CLAIMS % OF CLAIMS
Offensive Unsuccessful 185 61.1%
Offensive Successful 41 13.5%
Defensive Unsuccessful 66 21.8%
Defensive Successful 11 3.6%
Total 303 100.0%
CONCLUSION
Detailed analysis of the case law leads to the conclusion that RFRA is neither as
effective nor as harmful as portrayed by either side of the debate.309 Although RFRA
filings have remained in double digits since 2006 and increased significantly in 2016,
these data alone are not indicative of a growing threat to religious liberty or harmful
use. The single largest group of claimants, incarcerated individuals, do not pose a
threat of misuse of RFRA and resultant injury.310 These data, when combined with
the fact that little more than one-third of claimants were private individuals, places
of worship or religious organizations, may be indicative of the absence of substantial
threats to religious freedom. RFRA also has not been subject to abuse by business
organizations which have accounted for all of three claims since 1993.311
RFRA’s muddled record is also apparent from the subject matter of the claims,
almost 60.0% of which related to conditions of confinement or the crime and tort
defense filed by incarcerated individuals.312 Other types of claims were distinctly in
the minority. Combined, religious expression and legal processes claims accounted
for less than 30.0% of all claims.313 It may be concluded from these data that reli-
gious liberties, whether they take the form of religious expression, objection to legal
processes, or arise from land-use or educational settings, are not under unrelenting
307 See supra Tables 13 & 14; infra Table 24.
308 See supra Tables 13 & 14; infra Table 24.
309 See supra notes 11–24 and accompanying text.
310 See supra Tables 4, 5 & 6.
311 See supra Table 6.
312 See supra Tables 7 & 9.
313 See supra Tables 7 & 9.
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attack. Furthermore, only four claims concerned issues related to the LGBTQ+ com-
munity.314 This is hardly proof that RFRA has served as a means by which to deprive
members of the LGBTQ+ community of their rights.
These conclusions are bolstered by the ability of federal courts to distinguish be-
tween meritorious and less compelling claims. Courts have terminated nonmeritorious
claims through motions in more than 78.0% of all claims.315 Places of worship and
incarcerated individuals have been the most successful claimants.316 Other claimants
have either filed small numbers of claims or have been largely unsuccessful.317 The
number of successful claims other than those relating to conditions of confinement
(twenty in total over the course of twenty-five years) can hardly be described as pos-
ing a threat to the rule of law.318 This paucity of successful claims is also indicative
of an absence of a sustained threat to the free exercise of religion. It is imperative for
all parties to the ongoing controversy over religious rights to forego exaggerations and
misrepresentations and take RFRA’s judicial history into account in future debates.
314 See supra notes 115, 133 and accompanying text.
315 See supra Table 18.
316 See supra Tables 16 & 19.
317 See supra Tables 16 & 19.
318 See supra Tables 17 & 20.
